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Tag: Learn SaaS

  • D2L: Continuing emphasis on services and completion of move to SaaS model

    D2L: Continuing emphasis on services and completion of move to SaaS model

    In last week’s post on Blackboard, I shared the roughly linear progression of migration of the Learn LMS to a software-as-a-service (SaaS) model – a move that we believe is more important than is the Learn Ultra user experience. If you take into account percentages of total Learn deployments, you see that Blackboard has roughly 25% of Learn clients on SaaS after starting in late Fall 2016, increasing by approximately 10% per year. ((Each point is taken from Blackboard public release of information either directly to us at e-Literate or in press releases.))

     

    Blackboard Learn SaaS Deployments over time

    Blackboard is not the only LMS company migrating to the cloud, however, and D2L  ((Disclosure: D2L and Blackboard and Instructure are all subscribers to our LMS Market Analysis service.)) has taken a more aggressive bet on SaaS for their Brightspace LMS platform (also based on AWS), as described in Summer 2018.

    While we heard grumblings from multiple clients during the transition – especially through early 2017 – D2L clearly made some hard choices and and is aggressively moving to the cloud, not just as an option, but as their primary delivery model. According to David Koehn, VP of Product Management at D2L:

    • All new Brightspace implementations are on AWS cloud;
    • Virtually all current Brightspace implementations use Continuous Delivery; and
    • Approximately 50% of current customers are already on the AWS version of cloud deployment; and
    • By the end of 2018, a large majority of customers will be on cloud deployment.

    Last Fall I spent time at D2L’s Kitchener, Ontario headquarters getting an update on the company’s progress on a number of initiatives. D2L executives described that all but roughly a dozen Brightspace clients are now on SaaS deployment, and by the end of 2019 they should be fully a SaaS platform company.

    Why is percentage of total deployments important? Two reasons are that the move to 100% SaaS deployment enables the movement to a single version of code, dramatically simplifying regression testing and enabling more rapid development of new designs, while also taking advantage of modern technology stacks. As described in the Summer 2018 post:

    David Koehn also pointed out that the real driver for the AWS cloud move by D2L is to enable a redesign of the user experience [branded Daylight] and to provide improved scalability and reliability. In other words, the cloud deployment is a means to the Daylight end.

    The downside, of course, is that pure SaaS deployments largely leads to a reduction in customization capabilities. Companies like D2L and Blackboard that are moving from an enterprise model to a cloud model are betting that they can build in appropriate configuration options (rather than customized code) and leverage third-party integrations to overcome this challenge. But to get the full advantage of SaaS, a company needs to do the entire move.

    I further spent some time in London and had the opportunity to talk with D2L’s London-based leadership team that covers EMEA and Latin America regions. D2L leaders in London presented a transparent and honest appraisal of the company’s current market position in Europe and Latin America, and where they see the biggest opportunities. For starters, D2L acknowledged that Instructure’s system-wide wins for the Canvas LMS in the Nordic countries had largely blocked opportunities for expansion in that region. Other areas, however, have been much more promising. They are doing well particularly in the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) with Ghent University in Belgium being an example of a recent, large (45,000 student) implementation. There have been important wins in the UK and Ireland, and activity in Spain seems to be picking up some momentum. Germany continues to be a challenging place to get a foothold partially due to university funding that favors in-house staff maintaining open source systems.

    In Latin America, D2L was open about cutting back investment in the region in 2017, particularly in Brazil, largely due to economic uncertainties and limited growth opportunities. They now see activity picking up in the region and have been investing to take advantage of the market potential.

    In both Europe and Latin America, the provision of professional services beyond the LMS platform, as well as willingness to add requested features, appears to be a differentiator for D2L, especially in comparison to Instructure. D2L has shown a much greater willingness to roll up their sleeves and collaborate on instructional design, course building, and online pedagogy using internal staff, almost in an Online Program Enablement model. It surprised me during my Fall HQ visit to see just how well-established is the content creation team that helps schools redesign courses and even design front-end web sites for online programs. We have heard similar messages from D2L customers and even from a consulting firm that works directly with Canvas and Brightspace customers.

    To a degree, none of this post is different from our Summer 2018 coverage other than updating on progress, so why has D2L not made more of a market share increase in the past year? I suspect there are three reasons. One is that D2L has done a better job updating their product line and introducing new services than they have done in fixing issues with current customers, particularly around data and analytics. During my Fall HQ meetings, when the D2L team was describing their new data and analytics approach called the Brightspace Data Platform, I pointed out that while this appears to be an improved approach, it does not acknowledge that D2L has been touting its data and analytics capabilities for years. There are leftover frustrations from customers based on previous attempts that did not match client expectations.

    The second reason is Instructure. While D2L is in a solid second place for new implementations worldwide (schools migrating from one LMS to another), they have also lost a number of clients in North America – almost all to the Canvas LMS. In our recent LMS Market Analysis report, we showed a transition graphic with higher ed LMS migrations from 2017 – 2018.

    LMS Migrations 2017-18 Higher Ed

    The third reason is that it is very difficult to be a third competitor in terms of customer mindshare. The academic LMS market has tended to have a narrative of a major competitor and an upstart. Blackboard and WebCT in the early and mid 2000s, Blackboard and Moodle in the late 2000s, and Blackboard and Canvas through much of the 2010s. It is difficult for a company like D2L to break through this narrative and be top of mind for institutions from day one of an evaluation.

    While D2L has challenges in market position and introduction of a new data and analytics approach, they are completing the transition to a SaaS platform company and focusing on flexibility and services.

  • Blackboard Updates: Learn SaaS progress and LMS market news

    Blackboard Updates: Learn SaaS progress and LMS market news

    Blackboard had a lot of news to share two weeks ago when we spoke with CEO Bill Ballhaus and senior teaching and learning executives. The updates addressed efforts to streamline the business, customer retention, and customer acquisition. Blackboard ((Disclosure: Blackboard is a subscriber to our LMS Market Analysis service.)) was upbeat about their current position and prospects going forward, but we see a mixed picture.

    Ballhaus said that Blackboard’s efforts to simplify the business were paying off and leading to greater focus on their core teaching and learning businesses. While the company was built as an enterprise software amalgamation based on 20+ corporate acquisitions, Ballhaus described how management is looking forward to becoming a Software as a Service (SaaS) business with a simpler focus. While the executives declined to comment on current M&A activity, Blackboard appears to be trying to sell its CashNet and Transact products that are part of the same business line focused on campus ID and payment processing, for up to $800 million and $720 million respectively ((Although it is possible that both of these reports are referring to the same combined transaction – CashNet and Transact together. This explanation makes more sense to me.)). Remembering that Blackboard reportedly tried but failed to sell the entire company for ~$3 billion in 2015, there is no guarantee that they will actually sell either unit or get the desired prices. [Update 3/7: Blackboard did end up selling entire Transact business unit , including CashNet, to PE firm Reverence Capital for a reported $720m.] But if they do succeed, the profits from either sale will help the company pay down and manage its debt. And it will back up the claims of focusing the company on core teaching and learning business.

    The claim of the company looking forward to being a pure-SaaS business is largely based on their ability to migrate the flagship Learn LMS client base over to the AWS-enabled Learn SaaS offering. Blackboard leadership believes that the ongoing migrating effort has been a critical factor in improving their customer retention numbers, an argument that we made last summer.

    The third issue, which is related to the first two, is that we believe that the migration to Learn SaaS might be a better indicator – at least in the short run – than Ultra adoption of whether a school plans to stick with Blackboard. Whether or not the school enables Ultra base navigation or any courses in the Ultra Experience.

    When a school moves to Learn SaaS, they tend to sign contract extensions for 1 – 3 years to cover the new services. And the migration to Learn SaaS does not suffer from the vague terminology issues – a school either uses Learn deployed on SaaS (through AWS) or they don’t.

    Ballhaus went so far as to say that Blackboard’s improvements in client retention was the primary factor in the overall market slowdown last year. While we certainly feel that Blackboard has benefited from the slowdown and has improved client retention lately, we are not convinced on the cause and effect dynamics. By tracking the public proclamations of Learn SaaS adoptions, we see an interesting linear trend leading to the current ~25% of Learn clients being on SaaS.

    Learn SaaS Adoptions Over Time

    Blackboard continued to present the importance of their broad product portfolio combined with their experience. Ballhaus stressed that the LMS is necessary but not sufficient as a strategy for the company. Blackboard management sees Blackboard at an inflection point in 2019 in a good way, and they stressed that their big focus will now be on data and analytics offerings. Remember this paragraph when we get to the Instructure update post.

    Early in February Blackboard announced what could be their biggest LMS win since we broke the news of University of Phoenix selecting Blackboard Learn Ultra in late 2015 (a migration that is scheduled to be complete by this summer). From the press release about Galileo Global and their 100,000+ student system:

    Blackboard today announced that Galileo Global Education, a leading international provider of higher education and Europe’s largest higher education group, will roll out Blackboard Learn with the Ultra experience as the common Learning Management System (LMS) for its network of 37 schools with 80 campuses across 10 countries. Blackboard Learn Ultra was selected over other cloud-based solutions for the ease of use, the powerful features, and the unparalleled level of support provided by Blackboard.

    On the surface, this is a big win for Blackboard, but the story comes with a caveat regarding its relevance to the LMS market. What was not shared during our call with Blackboard executives is that they share their private equity owner (Providence) with Galileo as described in late 2017.

    Laureate Education, Inc. (NASDAQ:LAUR), the world’s largest global network of higher education institutions, and Galileo Global Education, a company under the umbrella of Providence Equity, a leading global asset management firm, have signed an agreement for the sale of Laureate’s institutions in Italy and Cyprus for a total transaction value of Euro 225 million (USD 263 million at the current exchange rate).

    Two or three schools within Galileo were already on Blackboard Learn, a few on Moodle, and the majority on Homegrown or not really using an LMS previously. Unless we can get independent confirmation about the nature of the selection (was it truly competitive or was it earmarked for Blackboard as long as they met minimum requirements), I would not extrapolate this news to show broader movements in the market.

    Blackboard also presented some data around roughly 200 new LMS customer acquisitions in 2018 (“new logos”) for both Open LMS (the rebranded Moodlerooms) and Learn.

    • The majority of the reported wins, roughly 120 based on interview, are for Open LMS, showing continued growth for this under-the-radar Blackboard product. These numbers are impressive, but we note that last year the company reported 223 Moodlerooms “new logos” in 2017. It will be interesting to track over time if this deceleration is primarily driven by the general market slowdown vs. fallout from the cancelled Moodle Partner agreement.
    • For the Learn LMS, Blackboard is reporting ~80 new logos in 2018, of which 52% are in higher education. If accurate, this would be a significant turnaround for the company; however, our data do not show this level of new wins for Blackboard unless you include Galileo as roughly 30 “new logos”. We asked Blackboard to back up that number with specifics such as sample listings to see if we have holes in our data, but Blackboard declined to provide further information due to “privacy reasons”. During the same time period, according to our data, Blackboard has lost more than 100 institutions, more than three fourths moving to Canvas and the remainder moving to D2L Brightspace.

    In the end, Blackboard is making steady progress with Learn SaaS deployments and contract extensions, benefiting from the LMS market slowdown, and winning their biggest new LMS account since 2015. We are not convinced that Blackboard is causing the slowdown or that their new Learn momentum goes beyond Galileo Global, but there are signs of progress worth sharing.

    Update 2/27: Fixed description of CashNet and Transact, which are part of the same business line, and added footnote.

  • Terminology is Key to Understanding Blackboard Learn Prospects

    Terminology is Key to Understanding Blackboard Learn Prospects

    There are three observations from Blackboard’s users conference that we feel are important to share before we pull together our thoughts for more comprehensive posts, and all three issues build off of Blackboard’s strong focus at the conference on Learn Ultra as the future of their LMS product line.

    Learn Ultra “In Production” or “Using Ultra”

    The first issue is terminology around Learn Ultra. Blackboard ((Disclosure: Blackboard is a client of the e-Literate LMS Market Analysis service and a participating sponsor in our Empirical Educator Project.)) is pushing the metric that there are 61 or 62 Learn Ultra customers “in production” or “using Ultra”, yet we have found very few that use, or even plan to use, Learn Ultra as their primary, institution-wide LMS. What gives? What became quite clear at the conference is that when Blackboard says in production, what they mean is that the LMS administrator has enabled the Ultra global navigation, which uses the new Ultra user experience framework as the landing page / dashboard with activity feed that users see before entering a specific course. The company calls this Base Navigation, but at this point every course can be configured to be in the Original Experience or the Ultra Experience. Thus, enabling the possibility of running a course in Ultra counts as in production.

    Slide from BbWorld18

    Once a school has enabled Learn Ultra Base Navigation, they could choose to move exclusively to Ultra (e.g. the University of Phoenix, Northwest Florida State College, and a few others), or they could choose to keep all courses in Original (e.g. Northeastern State University), or they could choose to have some courses in Ultra and some in Original (used by the majority of schools investigating Ultra). This last mode is known as Dual Course mode, and even Blackboard executives are surprised to find out that the vast majority of schools putting Ultra in production are in fact running in Dual Course. For many of these schools, there are no definitive plans to ever move exclusively to Ultra.

    This distinction is important, as the majority of functionality for an LMS occurs within a course, even if we did hear a few schools present that they saw some end-user benefits to having the landing page itself. We will add more commentary on this subject in future posts, but for now the takeaway is that Ultra in production numbers from Blackboard do not necessarily mean that any or most courses are in the Ultra Experience.

    Product Variations Resulting in Three Dates for New Features

    The second issue is that Blackboard Learn has two experiences (Ultra and Original), three deployments (self-hosting, managed-hosting by Blackboard, and SaaS-hosting at using AWS), often resulting in three different dates for full delivery of new features.

    Slide from BbWorld18

    Keeping in mind that the Original Experience is available on all three deployment models but Ultra is available only in SaaS, here is the view of the final delivery groupings for the courses:

    • Learn Original on self-hosting and Learn Original on managed-hosting, which the bulk of their customers use, is the first case.
    • Learn Original on SaaS-hosting, which represents the bulk of their 383 customers on Learn SaaS announced at the conference, is the second case.
    • Learn Ultra, which represents some subset of the 62 customers announced as “Ultra in production”, is the third case.

    Of course there is significant overlap in terms of common code, such as the micro-services running in the SaaS environment for both experiences, or shared source code between deployment options. But from a feature delivery perspective, the full release often has three different delivery dates – Original SH & MH, Original SaaS, and Ultra.

    This is good news or bad news, depending on your perspective. For Blackboard’s customers, it means more options without forced migrations. Blackboard staff stated several times in presentations and in hallway conversations that none of the deployment options or experiences have any plans to go end-of-life or even into maintenance mode. But on the other hand, Blackboard will not achieve many of the benefits of becoming a cloud product company until they can move the majority of development purely onto SaaS.

    SaaS Better Indicator Than Ultra of Client Retention

    The third issue, which is related to the first two, is that we believe ((OK, OK. I admit that Michael should get credit for seeing this issue more clearly than I did. Not many people read footnotes, so I feel comfortable with this admission.)) that the migration to Learn SaaS might be a better indicator – at least in the short run – than Ultra adoption of whether a school plans to stick with Blackboard. Whether or not the school enables Ultra base navigation or any courses in the Ultra Experience.

    When a school moves to Learn SaaS, they tend to sign contract extensions for 1 – 3 years to cover the new services. And the migration to Learn SaaS does not suffer from the vague terminology issues – a school either uses Learn deployed on SaaS (through AWS) or they don’t.

    For now, just treat this as clarification on the complexities of Blackboard Learn LMS options that became more apparent at the conference.

    Update 7/23: Changed header and some text in second section to focus on dates of feature delivery.