e-Literate

Present is Prologue

Author: Michael Feldstein

  • Preparing Professors for Online Teaching: How Long Does It Take?

    I recently had some conversations with a small university that is starting up a new distance learning program. The university president is convinced that the two-hour intro course provided by eCollege would be enough for professors to get up to speed on designing and teaching online. This sounded pretty far out-of-whack to me, so I decided to check around at some schools that have successful programs with multi-year track records. As a sample, the New School for Social Research apparently requires new online teachers to attend a six-week course in which they are online at least four days a week before they are allowed to teach their first class. (Returning teachers apparently “only” have to attend a four-week three-day-a-week refresher course.) The Borough of Manhattan Community College requires professors to attend a full semester training course, and all online course curricula have to be approved by a panel of distance learning administrators and designers before the course can be taught.

    What it comes down to, I think, is that not everybody believes that there is such a thing as pedagogy. If you believe that teaching is just pouring content into empty vessels, like Charles Dickens’ Professor Gradgrind, then what’s there to learn about distance learning besides which buttons to click?

  • MemeStreams Update

    Tom Cross of MemeStreams contacted me to let me know that an API is in the works (though it may take them a while to get it done due to workload and bandwidth issues). If you have any use cases that might help the MeamStream folks think through their design, you might want to drop Tom a note.

  • The Chronicle: 8/13/2004: Professors Seek Compensation for Online Courses

    According to this article in the Chronicle, it looks like an increasing number of institutions are putting the screws to their faculty to do more online learning work for less money. The story starts with an anecdote about a county college in California pressuring faculty to use sabbatical time for online course development. It continues with the following:

    In the 1999 survey, the average minimum overload pay was $1,885. In 2002 it was $1,620, a decrease of 14 percent. The average maximum overload pay also dropped, from $4,097 in 1999 to $2,740 in 2002, a 33-percent decline.

    While differences in salary and hours spent working may be partly responsible for the decrease in overload pay, the amount of the drop-off is significant, Ms. Schifter says. “I’m not sure that it paints a rosy picture.”

    The proportion of faculty members surveyed who “often” received time off to develop online courses also dropped, from 13 percent in 1999 to 10 percent in 2002. However, the percentage of those who often received extra compensation for online teaching increased from 26 percent in 1999 to 28 percent in 2002.

    In order to know what’s “fair” you really have to know how much each institution is netting on these courses. Typically, online learning programs lose money in the first year or two and then become money makers in the out years. In an earlier post I noted that UMass appears to be making a 90% profit margin on their courses, (though the description is vague, and we don’t know if this is gross, net, or even really profit). If you use Marshall University’s online calculator, the profits look more realistic (and more fair). Plugging in the example numbers that Marshall helpfully supplies from their own experience, they lose money in the first two years, have a 10% net margin in year 3, and a 40% net margin by year 7. That strikes me as roughly fair for all parties. Of course, Marshall pays faculty extra for both online course development and online delivery.

  • Is Johnson's "Clustering Emergence" Really Small-world Network Formation?

    I was thinking some more last night about Stephen Johnson’s new position that there are separate types of clustering and adaptive emergence as I was reading Albert-Laszlo Barabasi’s book Linked (which I am enjoying immensely, by the way; more on that in a later post). I suddenly had a flash of intuition that what Johnson now refers to as “clustering” emergence in the Dean campaign and other political grassroots events may just be the formation of a small-world network.

    Here’s the evidence:

    • The Dean campaign achieved incredibly rich, fast, and robust communication with its grass roots, just as you would expect in a small-world network.
    • The Blog For America site acted as a network hub, which is just the kind of catalyst you need to turn a normal grassroots network into a small-world network.
    • The sense that this powerful, organic “system” suddenly “emerged” is consistent with the kind of sudden and dramatic phase transition that is typical at the moment of small-world network formation.

    Intriguing, huh?

    It might be interesting to graph the Dean campaign’s network of support web sites, blogs, etc., and compare it to the other campaigns. Did Dean’s support web conform to a power law? Did Kerry’s? Bush’s? One aspect that makes this harder is that, with MeetUp factored into the picture, the network extends outside the Internet in some significant ways and therefore might be a lot harder to map.

  • Constructivism, Cognitivism, and Behaviorism in Weak Science

    TCRecord just published a great example of the kind of weak science that strikes me that as a perfect example of why I don’t bother to read the academic literature on learning theory with any regularity.

    The article starts off well enough:

    Teachers exert the greatest influence in the classroom through the way in which they engage students in the curriculum, but the overwhelming complexities of learning and teaching have clouded the value of important findings regarding the teacher’s role in creating powerful learning experiences for children. For instance, the attention to teacher behaviors so common in the 1970s has fallen out of favor as the complexities of the classroom, diversity of students, understanding of how children learn, and post-modernist agendas have called into question the simplistic causal relationships sought at that time. However, the overzealous abandonment of causal relationships and the turn toward foggy notions of teaching (e.g., teacher as facilitator and guide) obscures the importance of intricate teacher behaviors and decision-making that teachers must consider in shaping classroom experiences to foster learning. This, in turn, interferes with teacher education efforts as teachers are presented with black boxes and vague generalizations that provide little guidance in efforts to improve practice.

    For example, many teachers and teacher educators stumble when asked to specifically describe what the teacher is doing when he or she is “facilitating” or “guiding.”

    Science is about proof. It’s all about “causal relationships.” So when I read this intro I think, “OK, these guys (actually, this guy and this gal) are going to try to inject some rigor here. Right on.”

    Next, they stake out their territory as cognitivists. Having already put in a dig at constructivism (or, at least, vague formulations of constructivism) with the slam on teachers as “facilitator or guide,” they go after the behaviorists:

    Unfortunately, attention to teacher behaviors is sometimes associated with training and behaviorism. This is reflected in Yeany and Padilla’s (1986) paper titled “Training Science Teachers to Utilize Better Teaching Strategies.” The word “training” is particularly disturbing as the complexities of teaching demand decision-making that reflects a deep understanding of ends, learning, research, and classroom context. “Training” is suited to some purposes, but not in preparing effective teachers for the ever-changing complexities they will encounter. Attention to teacher behaviors is not a prescription for practice, but rather a means to promote awareness and consideration of decisions often unrecognized by teachers, teacher educators, and researchers.

    In other words, we don’t care about what teachers do in a particular instance; we care about what teachers think they’re doing. What is their mental model? Again, this is fine. Any academic paper involves a certain necessary amount of territorial marking. We now know that they care about empirical evidence and that they care about it because it reveals a teacher’s mental model. Classic cognitivism. Fine. It would have been nice if they chose to either put out a more thorough, principled argument against behaviorism or simply stated “we’re approaching this question from a cognitivist perspective” rather than sneering at the use of the word “training” (in an article not previously cited, as opposed to the article which the authors are purportedly writing about) and pretending that this is actually an argument against the behaviorist position, but whatever. The positioning at the front can be forgiven for being a little course if it turns out that the meat-and-potatoes arguments are decent.

    So let’s get to the main course:

    For example, following the initial question, “Bob, what is the common name for Quercus alba?” Croom suggests:

    �If Bob doesn’t know the answer, probe a little bit to find out what he does know. “Bob, first of all, give me the names of all the oaks we have studied in class so far.” The key point is to get Bob to give you a correct answer to at least a portion of the question. The message this will send to the class is that they are expected to know the material and are responsible for their own participation in the class.

    While students will certainly know they are expected to know the material, they have no reason to believe they will be supported in learning the content. For instance, whether Bob is called on immediately before or after the question, he has now been thrust to center stage in front of his peers. This is evident by other students in class looking at Bob as they and the teacher wait for him to answer. If Bob doesn’t answer, then either he or another student awaits the dreaded moment to once again be interrogated in front of their peers. Either way, as Rowe (1974a) stated, “the pattern of interchange between teachers and children still more closely resemble[s] an inquisition than a joint investigation or a reasonable conversation.
    And the evidence for this position is…?

    To begin with, we don’t know what “probe a bit” means. How is “probing” more specific than “facilitating” or “guiding”? And if it isn’t, how can we know if it does or doesn’t work? The authors seem to assume that they know what it means and argue that it is ineffective. What is their evidence? Citation of another academic who states that “the pattern [er…which pattern?] of interchange…more closely resembles an inquisition than a joint investigation or a reasonable conversation.” Talk about the “eye of the beholder”!

    Put aside the theoretic posturing for a moment and just picture the scenario being described in your mind’s eye, i.e, a teacher “probing a bit” to find out what the student knows when he doesn’t know the full answer. On the one hand, I can imagine situations where this is perfectly fine and acceptable. I once witnessed a math teacher who, upon hearing a student say that he didn’t know how to solve a problem, asked the student (with perfect deadpan), “Well, then, how would you solve it if you did know?” The student the proceeded to solve the problem on the board, without hesitation. No kidding.

    On the other hand, I have also witnessed (as have we all, I think), a teacher harassing a student, either intentionally or unintentionally but definitely gratuitously humiliating the kid who just doesn’t know the damned answer. It can go either way. The real question is how we know when and how to ask the follow-up questions to promote learning.

    Now. Let’s be honest. Do you think that a teacher will come to an answer to this conundrum by reflecting on the theory of constructivism, cognitivism, or behaviorism? Please. The teacher will go with her gut, because more often than not, all she gets from the “research” is the gut reactions of the authors wrapped in the costume of scientific inquiry. And all she gets from the theory itself is usually some grand over-generalization that has little connection to the kid or the circumstances. Going with her gut over the theory is the right thing to do. I’ll trust a good teacher’s gut instinct any day of the week.

    I’m not saying that there’s no role for theory and science in teaching. I’m saying let’s put away our grand unified field theories of learning and focus on what is knowable and testable, i.e., let’s find the places where science in its current state can make an authentic contribution to teaching practice.

  • Steven Johnson Speaks (Again) on Emergence in the Dean Campaign

    Johnson has a chapter out [PDF] in a new online book about “Extreme Democracy,” which includes contributing luminaries such as Clay Shirky and Joi Ito. In his chapter, Johnson clarifies how his thoughts about emergence in democracy have evolved since his book came out (and since the Dean campaign crashed and burned):

    Watching the Dean campaign’s meteoric rise and fall helped me to see some of my original ideas about emergence with a new clarity, particularly as they related to collective behavior among humans. I think now that I was really forcing two kinds of emergence to coexist under a single umbrella term. Imagine it as the difference between clustering and coping. Some simpler emergent systems are good at forming crowds; other, more complex ones, are good at regulating the overall state of the system, adapting to new challenges, evolving in response to opportunities. Sometimes, I suspect, it’s helpful to blur the distinctions between clustering and coping for simplicity’s sake. But when you subject them to the intense scrutiny and pressure of a national political campaign, the fault lines inevitably appear. Right now, emergent politics is brilliant at clustering, but clustering is not enough to get a national candidate elected. In fact, without the right coping mechanisms in place, clustering can sometimes work against your interests. You need crowds to get elected to public office, but without more complex forms of self-regulation, crowds can quickly turn into riots. And riots don’t win elections.

    He goes on to suggest that the Dean campaign (and, by extension, current forms of emergence in politics in general) was excellent at bringing groups of people together, i.e., “clustering,” but lousy at responding to changing circumstances, i.e., “self-regulation.” The Dean campaign may have been a complex system, but it was not a complex adaptive system.

    As a side note, Johnson cites al Qaida as a good example of emergent organization, just as I had suggested in an earlier post (though I think we know little enough about the top-down vs. bottom-up organization of the group that this remains to be proven definitively).

    This is a good read.