e-Literate

Present is Prologue

Author: Michael Feldstein

  • Moodle and Blackboard Cut Ties

    Sometimes breaking news overturns your blogging schedule. We have had e-Literate staff at four LMS conferences in the past few weeks and have a raft of news and analysis to publish. However, there’s some big news today out of Moodle that needs at least a timely mention while we write our other posts and chase down the details for more analysis of this event.

    Moodle just announced that Blackboard “will transition out of Moodle’s Certified Moodle Partner program in the coming months.”

    This is consequential for both Moodle and Blackboard. On the Moodle side, we have written about Moodle’s financial dependence on Blackboard as a partner and how that creates some risk for the community. Since those posts, Moodle has received $6 million in outside investment. According to Moodle Pty’s press release, that investment, combined with a decline in Blackboard’s financial contributions to Moodle made it feasible for Moodle to break off from the partnership.

    Note that all the information we have right now is Moodle’s press release; we will circle back to this story once we’ve had a chance to talk to folks from both Moodle and Blackboard and have caught up enough on our blogging schedule that we can give this story the attention that it deserves.

    But here’s my snap reaction: For Moodle, there is good news and risk. The good news is that it clears up the uncertainty that we have been reporting on. Moodle will now have a chance to demonstrate that they can be sustainable without depending on Blackboard. The risk, of course, is that they will now have to demonstrate that they can be sustainable without depending on Blackboard. We’ll try to get some more color on this from Martin Dougiamas.

    On the Blackboard side, it’s bad news in the short term, but the impact is hard to quantify. Because of the open source license under which Moodle is released, Blackboard can continue to use the code in their Moodlerooms business. However, Moodle Pty. owns the Moodle trademark. So unless Blackboard negotiated something with them, they will have to change the name of their product and division. In the medium term, there are open questions about their ability/willingness to continue contributing code to mainline Moodle, customer reactions to the split and, on the potential upside, Blackboard’s ability to make development decisions independently of Moodle Pty. There is some potential upside for them in that last piece, as well as not having to pay the partnership fee to Moodle. We will be reaching out to Blackboard (if they don’t reach out to us first) to hear more from them about how they see the future of their Moodlerooms business.

    So there’s still a lot here that we don’t understand yet. But this is significant news in the LMS world.

  • What’s Important about the Blackboard Market Share News

    My last post on Canvas’ US market share surpassing Blackboard’s predictably got a fair bit of attention, including some follow-up press elsewhere on the internet. There were a few comments to the press made by Blackboard executives and industry experts that merit some further examination.

    But let me start by being crystal clear about one point: In and of itself, the fact that (by our count) Canvas now has two more primary systems than Blackboard Learn in the US market, is purely symbolic. It has historic significance for those of us who have been long-time watchers (or sufferers) in the LMS market. But if Blackboard’s number were ten higher or ten lower, it wouldn’t change the big picture.

    The more important question is this: If the crossing of the lines is purely symbolic, then what is it symbolic of? What actually matters about this story to colleges and universities, and why?

    Let’s see if we can separate the signal from the noise by working our way through a couple of well-sourced articles and the commentary that they contain.

    First, there’s Lindsay McKenzie’s piece in Inside Higher Ed. She chased down a number of customer reactions. Some of these were the usual pile-on of “we hate these guys and we love those guys.” ((See the comments on my original post; LMS personal commentary tends to be just a few steps removed from primal scream therapy. I’m not judging; just observing.)) But she also got an interesting pricing anecdote, which is helpful given how opaque LMS pricing tends to be:

    Now that Canvas is the “hot product,” Instructure has been trying to aggressively increase its fees, said [Emporia State University’s Rob] Gibson. A 5 percent increase per year for such services is not unusual, but Instructure has been asking for more. Gibson said his institution has had to push back against further increases.

    Blackboard, on the other hand, was “desperate to keep us,” said Gibson. They offered a 50 percent discount to stop Emporia from making the switch. “I think they could see the writing on the wall,” he said.

    Customers take note: Blackboard’s change in fortunes may affect the behavior of all the LMS vendors.

    The article also has a quote from Lou Pugliese who, in addition to being a current senior innovation fellow at ASU and CEO from Blackboard’s early days, was CEO of Moodlerooms when Blackboard acquired it. In other words, he knows something about the LMS market. He raised an interesting question:

    Pugliese said that the statement that Canvas is “now the primary LMS in more U.S. colleges and universities than Blackboard Learn” is misleading. “The real measurement metric should be akin to website traffic. Statistical data on number of unique users, not total ‘installations,’” he said.

    For a long time, Blackboard has been at the top of the LMS food chain not only in raw market share but in terms of having a high percentage of the largest customers. In fact, at one point the company killed off Learn Basic precisely because the company calculated that small colleges were not profitable enough to justify continuing to sell the cheaper, no-frills version of Learn.

    So, if we look at number of students served in the US market rather than the number of universities served, is the market share picture substantially different?

    USA Enrollement.png

    Nope. ((But the picture of Brightspace’s market share relative to Moodle’s does.))

    Second lesson: Blackboard’s customer loss is no longer contained to smaller colleges. Both the IHE piece and the Bloomberg piece that I will be commenting on next mention that Cornell, which is the birthplace of Blackboard, has announced that they will be moving to Canvas. This is another example of a milestone with more symbolic than literal significance. Blackboard’s loss of Cornell may sting from an emotional perspective, but it’s probably not material to the company’s balance sheet in and of itself. On the other hand, the loss of schools like Cornell is material. As is the loss of schools like Pugliese’s current professional home, ASU.

    Lastly from the IHE piece, there’s a substantial quote from Blackboard’s Chief Learning and Innovation Officer Phill Miller:

    Phill Miller, chief learning and innovation officer at Blackboard, said that the data shared by Feldstein were “not consistent with our own,” which show that “Blackboard remains the dominant ed-tech company around the globe.” He added that Blackboard Learn is not the only service that the company offers — “we have thousands of Blackboard Collaborate, Moodle and Blackboard Ally clients,” he said.

    Miller said that over the past year and a half, Blackboard has “taken a hard look as a company at what we need to do to better serve our clients.”

    In response to customer feedback, Blackboard has been working to improve existing products and develop new ones. Though Miller notes that development of Ultra “took longer than we anticipated,” he says institutions are reacting positively to the changes.

    “We’re in a much different and better place than we were a year ago,” said Miller. “We’re seeing that RFPs are slowing down, our renewal rate is strong and we’ve won in a number of competitive situations recently.”

    There’s a lot to unpack here. Let me preface my comments by saying that I’ve known Phill for well over a decade and have a high opinion of his integrity. I feel the need to say this because his comment about our data not being consistent with Blackboard’s own comes across in the context of the article as a dodge that I don’t believe Phill would make in regular conversation. Our numbers likely do differ modestly from Blackboard’s. Counting installations is more complex and requires more methodological decisions than you might think, such as the date when you officially register a switchover. But I don’t believe our numbers are different by much, and I don’t believe anyone can credibly deny that Canvas has achieved rough parity with Blackboard Learn in US market share.

    The comment about Blackboard having “taken a hard look…at what we need to do to better serve our clients” is the right thing for any executive at a company with declining market share to say, and I believe it is also true in this case. Blackboard has had a long reputation hangover from former CEO Michael Chasen, who was notorious for his disregard of customer satisfaction. For what it’s worth, Blackboard is not that company anymore. Emphasis added here because people still have strong feelings about the company’s behavior from that era and don’t always realize that there has been a complete turnover in company management since then. (Twice.)

    Case in point: To his credit, Miller owned up to the delays in Ultra. This isn’t new, but it is ongoing, so Blackboard needs to continue to be up front about the problem until customers are satisfied that it has been fully resolved. The company may be struggling to bring Ultra up to a level that customers consider “feature-complete,” but they have made a consistent and visible effort to take responsibility for their results.

    Miller’s point that Blackboard sells more than just Learn is a valid and important one, but has to be weighed in the context of the company’s short- and medium-term financial challenges. The real issue of concern is the potential behavior of their debt and equity owners. I’ll come back to the point about Blackboard’s total product portfolio in that conxt.

    Miller’s last comment, about seeing RFPs slowing down and a strong customer renewal rate, is the most consequential. Given that the market has been chasing Instructure on reliable SaaS, usability, and high-quality customer service, there has been (and continues to be) an outstanding question of how long Blackboard’s customer base will remain patient as it tries to catch up on these fronts. To be honest we at e-Literate are somewhat skeptical of Blackboard’s ability to forecast. Jay Bhatt, the company’s previous CEO, did enormous damage to the company’s sales force, which is an essential component of any company’s sensory apparatus. If customers are getting nervous and thinking about bolting, the sales reps should pick that up early. But it’s not clear that Blackboard’s early warning system is working properly at the moment. When the e-Literate team is at BbWorld next week, we’ll be looking for clues about customer sentiment.

    The second “Blackboard alert” article worth reading is the one by Katherine Doherty and Eliza Ronalds-Hannon at Bloomberg News. This one wasn’t a reaction to our piece but rather coincidental timing triggered by the same underlying concerns. I spoke with Doherty, whose beat includes companies with distressed debt.

    The debt is the real existential issue. Without it, Blackboard would just be a company that continues to struggle with its flagship product but which would have enough runway to turn itself around over time, one way or another. In the Bloomberg article, Blackboard CEO Bill Ballhaus repeats Miller’s reminder that the company sells other products and services. And as we have pointed out repeatedly here on e-Literate, the international markets are an increasingly large percentage of Blackboard’s financial picture. The fundamentals of the company may not be great, but they’re not dire either. Given time, good leadership, and low debt, a company in this position should be able to right itself.

    But because Blackboard has high debt, their situation potentially a lot more volatile. One major reason why the market share milestone matters is that it’s an apt metaphor for Blackboard’s financial waterline. At their current debt levels, the company can’t afford for their market share to continue to drop.

    Contract losses have sent Blackboard’s revenue and earnings sliding, according to people with knowledge of the matter, making it harder to carry more than $1.3 billion of rated debt. With some of Blackboard’s bonds selling at deeply distressed levels, Ballhaus is crafting a comeback, and possible options include the sale of its payment processing division, said the people, who asked not to be identified because the discussions are private.

    Even in this situation, the results for Blackboard Learn customers won’t necessarily be bad, or even noticeable—depending on how the finances are resolved. If Blackboard sells off Transact, gets a good price for it, pays down some debt, and otherwise sticks with the current management’s plan, that could buy them some time and some ability to survive further erosion of market share around Learn. If the company’s owner, Providence Equity, decides to take more drastic steps, then the potential impact on customers is unpredictable. And Providence’s calculations regarding how much drastic action is required must be at least partly driven by their assessment of how close Blackboard is to bottoming out in LMS market share loss.

    So what are the take-aways for LMS customers?

    • It is no longer the case the Blackboard is the big dog and Instructure is the underdog. And, as is suggested in the customer quote above about pricing, that may have consequences for the behaviors of all the vendors.
    • Blackboard is in a financially precarious situation in the short term. They have a number of options for getting themselves out of this situation, some of which are more impactful on customers than others. This is worth watching closely.
    • In the medium term, the fate of the company depends on them staunching the bleeding of market share, not because the loss of Learn customers is in danger of driving them out of business in and of itself, but because they need to buy time with their equity owners so that they can execute a turn-around strategy that will keep the company (relatively) intact. Ally may be a runaway hit in the market, but if its revenues aren’t growing faster than Learn revenues are shrinking, that will not go over well with equity investors.
    • The current situation is real trial by fire for Blackboard’s executive leadership, including some new players. Phill Miller in particular may have been in senior management for quite a while, but with the departure of Katie Blot, he is now very much in the hot seat now. And he’s not the only one. In the same company blog post that announced Phill’s promotion, Ballhaus announced a new Chief Portfolio Officer, Chief Strategy Officer, and Teaching and Learning product line lead. This is a particularly challenging moment to be an executive at that company.
    • All of this puts a lot of pressure on Blackboard to get customers migrated over to SaaS and convince the market that Ultra is ready for prime time now.
    • Blackboard may be in a tight spot, but don’t conflate that with behavior of the previous management in the bad old days. Schadenfreude may feel good, but it doesn’t help when you’re making strategic decisions. Evaluate Blackboard based on what they do today, not on what they did 10 years ago.

    Watch this space.

  • Canvas Surpasses Blackboard Learn in US Market Share

    As of July 6th, our data partner LISTedTECH informs us that Canvas is now the primary LMS in more US colleges and universities than Blackboard Learn. By a margin of two; Canvas has 1,218 installations, while Blackboard Learn has 1,216. Statistically speaking, the two companies are tied for US market share:

    % USA

    Still, this is a stunning development for a company that seemed to have established an unbreakable market dominance a decade ago. When Blackboard, the number-one US platform in early 2005, announced that it would be acquiring its closest competitor (WebCT) in early 2006, the combined company owned approximately 70% of the US and Canadian market. Their next largest competitors were far, far behind. A few platforms, most of which no longer exist, were vying with “homegrown” to become the Dr. Pepper of the LMS market at the time that the Coke acquired the Pepsi.

    qKArWlGQ

    Blackboard’s acquisition of WebCT hit the market like a thunderbolt. At the time, I wrote,

    Yes, yes, we’ve all heard the news by now. BlackCT Wednesday has hit. Will it be remembered as The Day the Music Died? I don’t think so. Unfortunately, it could be remembered as The Day the Music Was So Badly Wounded That It Became Barely Listenable for a Really Long Time.

    You know. Kinda like the ’80’s. Except with software.

    Blackboard was already viscerally disliked, both as a product and as a company, by a large segment of the market in those days. Customers responded to the merger by talking with their feet. Moodle, Sakai, and Desire2Learn—A.K.A. Brightspace—all surged in 2006 and 2007 as customers began fleeing the Blackboard behemoth.

    Blackboard responded by suing D2L ((D2L was called Desire2Learn at the time and shortened its name later.)) for patent infringement in 2006, acquiring ANGEL Learning in 2009, and acquiring Moodlerooms—the largest US Moodle support company—in 2012. It seemed like the US LMS market was done. Any time a competitor grew large enough to become a threat, Blackboard would acquire them and force migrate their customers to Learn. If they couldn’t acquire the company, then they would attempt to sue them into submission.

    Nobody would have predicted that a project started by two graduate students Brigham Young University and assisted by their professor, who happened to be a bored former executive from a pioneering cloud storage company, would become the product that could break through Blackboard’s dominance. Yet that is exactly what happened. The Canvas LMS was concieved, and Instructure formed, in 2008. The combination of a reliable, cloud-based offering, updated user interface, reputation for outstanding customer service, and brash, in-your-face branding, the company surpassed all of the more established contenders to take the crown (at least in the US).

    Not just symbolic

    Anybody who has paid attention to this market at all knows that Blackboard’s market share has been dropping while Instructure’s has been rising. But this symbolic end of an era marks more than just those two market share lines crossing. Bigger changes are afoot.

    Humans have a tendency to assume that what is true now and has been true for a while will continue to be true in the future. The LMS market was more vulnerable to change than we thought it was in 2006, and it is more vulnerable to change than many realize today. Blackboard in particular is in a precarious position. Their long-delayed Ultra user experience refresh has been dragging out for so long now that customers who have been hanging on waiting for it are in danger of losing patience. It’s not clear whether, as of the upcoming BbWorld conference this month, Ultra will finally be feature-competitive with either the original Blackboard Learn interface or the competition. And even if it is, it’s unclear whether that will be enough to prevent another mass exodus of Blackboard customers, nevermind attract new ones.

    Meanwhile, their private equity ownership has the company in financial peril. Even with a shrinking customer base, Blackboard has been a relatively well-run and financially healthy company—if you don’t count the pile of debt that their private equity owner has saddled them with. But they have big interest payments to make. When Providence Equity bought Blackboard, they paid for it by taking out something analagous to a massive mortgage on Blackboard itself, with the plan that Blackboard would pay off that debt with the profit that it generates. This is a classic private equity investment strategy, but sometimes it backfires. Blackboard would be doing OK financially, despite its shrinking market share, were it not for those massive mortgage payments. The LMS market is seasonal, which means that Blackboard sells more in some months than in others. During the better months, the company can still comfortably make its debt payments. During the slower months, debt ratings company Moody’s warns that Blackboard’s margin for error on being able to make those debt payments is worryingly thin.

    But it’s worse than that. Sticking with the mortgage analogy, some of Blackboard’s debt has what you can think of as very aggressive foreclosure terms, in the form of “lien covenants.” If the company’s cushion for making its debt payments drop below a certain level—even if it doesn’t actually miss a payment—then the bondholders can demand that Blackboard pay off the principle. If this were to happen, it would likely force the Blackboard into bankruptcy. (Keep in mind that bankruptcy doesn’t necessarily mean that the company disappears. But it’s not good.)

    So because of its financing, Blackboard’s continuing loss of market share is at the tipping point of changing from a serious problem to an existential threat.

    Lo, how the mighty have fallen.

    What might happen next

    Chances are good that we will see some fairly dramatic changes at Blackboard soon. Even if Ultra catches up with the competition this summer, and even if that is enough to prevent a major customer exodus, and even if all of that is enough for the company to avoid triggering the bankruptcy-inducing lien covenants, the company will have to take some steps to improve its financial soundness. The easiest place for them to start would be to sell off of some parts of the business so that they can pay down some of their debt. (Blackboard’s Transact commerce and security line of business is the most obvious candidate.) But that may only be the beginning. The next possible move would be for Providence Equity, the company that owns Blackboard, to sell them off—either as a whole or in pieces. Depending on how all of this plays out, it could be good, neutral, or bad for current customers. All we can say with confidence right now is that there will probably be some significant changes fairly soon.

    The other companies are not static either. Instructure lost much of its executive management team, and we are now hearing rumors of a second wave of departures in the Asia/Pacific region. Between these changes and Wall Street’s pressure on the company to show more growth in the corporate training side of their business, it remains to be seen how much past performance will be predictive of future behavior. Meanwhile, D2L has quietly been improving their core product.

    People tend to only focus on the top two competitors in any product category: Coke and Pepsi, Hertz and Avis, Uber and Lyft, and so on. And, as I noted at the top of the post, they also tend to underestimate potential for change. If Blackboard’s situation changes dramatically enough to shake up these default assumptions among customers, then that could open up all kinds of possibilities. Maybe Brightspace will rise, or Moodle will be resurgent. Maybe Instructure will continue to gobble up market share until it owns the market the way Blackboard did back in the day. Maybe a couple of kids in some university somewhere will come up with the next big thing. Maybe Blackboard will pull a rabit out of a hat. It’s hard to know right now. The market is approaching a tipping point, which means that a some basic assumptions about the LMS market that people could take for granted during the era of Blackboard’s dominance are not safe to assume anymore.

    We just released our Spring 2018 report for our LMS market analysis subscription service, which provides more context for these potential changes (including a more international view of the markets than I’ve provided in this post). As we enter LMS conference season, we will be providing increased coverage of the market, both here on the blog and in the monthly newsletter in the subscription service.

    Buckle up, folks.

  • Some Thoughts on OER

    Last week I had the good fortune to co-keynote the Northeast Regional OER Summit at UMass Amherst. My counterpart keynoter was Don Kilburn, the current CEO of UMassOnline and former CEO of Pearson North America. We each gave brief talks, followed by a conversation facilitated by UMass Amherst’s Marilyn Billings. It was a lively discussion that inspired a lot of passionate debate on Twitter. That, in turn, inspired requests for more information about the conversation from people who weren’t able to come. So this is my recap.

    Don’s talk

    Don was there in his UMassOnline capacity but he spoke from his perspective as a long-time senior executive at a major textbook publisher. From the beginning, it was clear that having Don on stage would be both potentially interesting and inevitably fraught. Many folks in the OER community have a visceral negative reaction to the way of thinking and the kind of language that Don employs instinctively due to his particular professional history. And Don, for his part, didn’t seem to have had a whole lot of exposure to or understanding of the audience he would be addressing. The most cringe-worthy moment was when he trotted out the old “free as in puppy” chestnut as if it were a novel statement and not something that the OER community, and the open source community before it, had heard ad nauseam for at least a decade. That cultural clash between the audience and the opening speaker…resulted in the kinds of tweets that you would expect, and appeared to have an outsized influence on the way a vocal segment of the audience reacted to the whole conversation.

    That’s unfortunate, in part because Don knows a lot that could be useful to people who want to learn how to be more effective at driving OER adoption and understanding how a broad cross-section of faculty approach curricular materials adoption in general. He knows about the many experiments, both successful and unsuccessful, that the textbook industry has tried in order to figure out which value propositions persuade faculty to adopt curricular materials. He knows what’s happening in the market right now, how the publishers think, where they are gaining traction, and where they are struggling. Whether or not you agree with him, he can provide useful intel that is normally inaccessible to academics.

    I won’t summarize his talk here, but since the first part of my talk built off of Don’s, you’ll hopefully get a rough sense of the ground he covered through my summary of my own talk.

    My talk, part one

    I’m not going to recap the discussion in strict chronological order. Instead, I’ll address the piece of my talk that built off of Don’s now and circle back to the other part—which was really the main part of my talk—later. In retrospect, the conversation after the talk provides some good context for understanding the main point I was trying to make.

    A lot of Don’s talk was about how curricular materials prices are coming down and how the industry is trying to establish the value of its product in the face of this change. This seemed like a good place for me to pick up, since the most common argument for OER is about affordability There is absolutely no question that the value of base informational content—the part of a textbook that could easily be replaced by a Wikipedia article, for example—has commoditized. This is one reason why textbook prices are coming down. (I could tell another story about used books and rentals and Amazon and Chegg, but the two narratives are really just two sides of the same coin.)

    In the curricular materials markets, there are two pricing bands that are beginning to emerge. The first one is in the $10 to $40 range, and it is often presented as either a cheap version of the print textbook—a black and white softcover, for example—or something close to a direct digital replacement of the book. The other band, in the $60 to $100 range, tends to have products with lots of formative assessments, student and instructor dashboards, nudges and reminders, and maybe adaptive capabilities. Here, publishers are trying to establish a different value proposition from the print textbook. The “courseware” products that typically inhabit this price band can provide both students and instructors with a lot more information about how the students are doing, whether they are coming prepared to class, and where they need help. I have written several posts about these two competing value propositions, labeling them as “good enough” versus “better enough”.

    As long as those two value propositions dominate the way in which curricular material choices are framed for (and by) the faculty, they will also frame the way that OER are valued. And I mean that partly in economic terms, since not all OER are cost-free to the students and none are cost-free to the creators and maintainers. If the Wikipedia-like portions of the textbook have little to no economic value, then what else are students paying for and how much should they have to pay for it? How much is professional curation—in the form of scope and sequence—worth? How much is it worth to have somebody align learning objectives, assessment questions, and the informational content? To keep the content up-to-date? To provide frequent, auto-graded or easy-to-grade formative assessments? To provide dashboards that show progress on those assessments? To provide adaptive learning tools as differentiated instruction aids? There is no one correct answer for each of these questions, but now at least the pricing is starting to become transparent enough and product options unbundled enough that it is possible to answer them. The affordability problem, while not yet solved, is moving in the right direction. Because unbundling is part of this movement, educators can start making more fine-grained, student-centered choices about any potential trade-offs between accessibility and effectiveness.

    In my view, the OER community needs to become more sophisticated in its discussions of these trade-offs and more respectful of the individual decisions faculty make as they try to find the right trade-offs for their particular contexts. “Free as in puppy” may be glib, but that doesn’t mean it’s completely false. On the one hand, I don’t know anybody who got a free puppy that didn’t…you know…already want a puppy and know that puppies require care and feeding. On the other hand, some people do underestimate the amount of care and feeding a puppy requires. If you want to make sure that those puppies don’t get given to a shelter or abandoned at the side of some road, you need to make sure that somebody is prepared to be responsible for them. You need a puppy sustainability strategy. Some puppies are more work than others, and some families are more prepared to care for puppies than others. Sometimes you’d be better off adopting a dog that’s already been house trained. Or to pay for a trainer. Or to get a cat instead. Or a goldfish. Any resource that has a cost of upkeep needs a sustainability plan. Resources that do more will often—though certainly not always—require more initial investment and more upkeep. A puppy that is going to be a family pet requires a different level of investment—both up front and ongoing—than a rescue dog or an agility dog.

    The utility of an open license, part 1

    Of course, “good enough” and “better enough” is not the only way to frame the value of either affordability or OER. This is where the conversation among OER advocates can (and did) get chaotic quickly. For example, one topic that came up during Q&A was the utility of an open license to enable faculty to customize the content to their students’ needs. I said that faculty can and do customize with proprietary content all the time, and that anyone who believes the only way to do this is with OER is fooling themselves.

    This comment caused some consternation. I stand by it.

    When faculty want to adjust proprietary content, they skip chapters, supplement with other content (including some they may have made themselves), reorder the content, combine different texts, and so on. Instructors are endlessly creative in the ways that they slice and dice proprietary content. In fact, this exact tendency is one reason why textbook publishers got into pricing trouble in the first place. They have known forever that English comp professors are likely to use maybe one out of every three readings in an anthology, and that the particular readings which get used will vary from professor to professor. So they produce anthologies with three or four times as many readings as any class could use in a term. They do the same thing with problem sets. Or textbook chapters. Maybe one Biology 101 professor likes to spend more time on cellular biology while another is into ecology. No problem; the publishers just put in lots of chapters on both. Faculty will use what they want.

    What you end up with by employing this publishing strategy is a puppy that has been house trained, agility trained, and rescue trained. That is one very expensive puppy. And the students—who, after all have to buy that puppy—get irritated because it is obvious to them that they will never have to use their dog for an avalanche rescue.

    Customization happens regardless of license. Yes, a license makes certain kinds of customization easier. It’s an affordance. If you train your puppy yourself, you can decide what you want to teach it to do. Our dog, who we adopted as an adult, was trained by her prior family to ring a bell with her nose when she wants to go out. That was apparently useful to them. But I’ve had lots of dogs during the course of my life, and we never had to train them to do something specific when they wanted to let us know that they had to go out. Each had his or her own way of accomplishing this function. We didn’t suffer from that particular loss of control.

    The definition of open education is an open question

    One weird aspect of the “free as in puppy” analogy is that it treats the dog like a possession whose primary salient characteristics are cost of purchase and cost of ownership. That’s certainly one valid way to think about curricular materials (though not about puppies). But if what you’re really interested in is a pedagogical approach—let’s call it “open education”—then this is not the only way, or even the best way, to think about OER. Some OER advocates are interested in open education as a way of teaching, with OER being a set of raw materials designed to support that way of teaching. The problem is that we don’t have anything close to a consensus on what “open education” actually is.

    Some of the summit attendees talked about the value of having students create and edit the content. Say you want your kid to learn some responsibility and empathy, as well as something about animal behavior and psychology. Having a dog will give them some of that. Having your kid train the dog will give them a lot more of it. Having two of your kids train the dog together will also teach them something about cooperation. In this case, the “cost” of training and caring for the dog is actually a benefit.

    There is overwhelming evidence that having students learn by doing (including by researching and authoring) can be very effective. But there are two caveats regarding how this general principle of learning translates into the specific activity of student co-creation of curricular materials. First, having students write and edit their own curricular content is not inevitably effective as an active learning strategy. Sometimes, sure. But like everything else in education, it’s highly context-dependent. Second, depending on how broadly the students are sharing this work, it’s not clear that you need an open license on it, or that you need all content and source materials to be openly licensed. If the instructor doesn’t put any license at all on the student-created content but makes it freely available on the web, is it OER? In spirit, probably, but that would not be consistent with common usage of the term.

    As a teaching strategy, I’m enthusiastic about having students co-create curricular materials. As a teaching philosophy, I’m agnostic and utilitarian about it. As teaching dogma—no pun intended—I’m deeply skeptical, as I am about all blanket generalizations about the “best” way to teach regardless of context.

    My favorite variation on student production of curricular materials as a teaching strategy is Mike Caulfield’s notion of choral explanations. It adds the dimension that having a handful of different explanations can be more helpful than having just one. Think about your own behavior when you’re looking up a health condition on Google or a how-to demonstration on YouTube. Do you tend to look at just one search result? Or do you look at a few different ones? I often look at a few, and sometimes more than a few. The reason we can have the benefit of that diversity is because, on the web, there are many different people producing content resources and sharing them for free. They may not have Creative Commons licenses, but they are OER in a real sense.

    Again, I’m enthusiastic about this approach as a teaching strategy and utilitarian about it as a teaching philosophy. If it works for your students, in your subject, with your pedagogical activities, that’s great.

    Not all open education advocates define it this way. And to be clear, I’m not trying to provide a comprehensive list of useful definitions for open education here. I’m summarizing and reflecting on last week’s conversation. But I do want to touch on a subset of those other definitions that are often less well defined, more essentialist, or both. Because they did come up in that conversation, and because that’s where there are real problems.

    Real problems

    One question I got in the Q&A was what advice I had about things that the open education community isn’t doing as well as it could. That’s easy: Stop bickering so much.

    Teaching, when done right, is deeply personal. That’s both good and bad. On the good side, first, many educators are motivated to be good teachers even when their environment actively disincentivizes them, because they care about their students. It’s one reason why educational systems produce so many success stories in spite of the fact that the systems themselves are deeply, disturbingly messed up. Also, there is evidence that the very fact that a teacher cares about a student has a strong chance of positively impacting that student’s physical, emotional, and financial wellbeing for the rest of their lives. (Many of us have our own personal stories about this, but there is also hard, longitudinal evidence.)

    The bad side of teaching being so personal is that it can be very hard to maintain ego boundaries when you care so deeply about so many students in a messed up environment like the modern classroom (or, really, like human existence in general). I speak from personal experience as well as from knowing, working with, and living with many educators over the course of my life. It’s hard to separate the job from your personal identity. For some people, “open education” is an affinity group of sorts.

    In and of itself, that’s fine. Teaching is hard, teachers deserve and need emotional support, and one way to get that support is to find your “tribe.” But I have observed a lot of infighting about shibboleths that mark membership in the open education tribe. Too often, it gets unreasonably heated and personal. At its worst, this behavior metastasizes into a particularly noxious form of identity politics. At that point, it is no longer about helping students.

    As I said in answer to the question at the summit, there are only two essential goals that I care about in education: (1) increasing access and (2) increasing the value that students get from the education that they can access. I am agnostic and utilitarian about everything else. To the degree that discussion, debate, or usage of open education teaching strategies or open educational resources furthers one or both of those goals, then I’m for it. To the degree that it distracts from activities that could further those goals, then I’m against it. In recent years when I have attended conferences that are billed as “OER” or “open education” events, I have not been impressed with the ratio of constructive conversations to painful distractions.

    This is absolutely fixable—if the participants decide that it is something they want to fix. I hope they do. Some of the brightest, most talented and dedicated educators I know are among these people. I would like to see them accomplish all the good in the world that they can.

    My talk, and the utility of an open license, part 2

    All of the conversation I described above is important. I’m glad we had it. But it wasn’t the conversation I had hoped to provoke. In the main part of my talk, I recapped the four levels of empirical education:

    1. Intuitively empirical: This comes down to whether you pay attention to your students and do something differently with them based on what you observe. Do you always do the same thing, or do you have a bag of tricks that you can draw from when you see students struggle? I believe that the substantial majority of educators are empirical in this sense. They may not think of it as empiricism, but they are observing student behaviors and are adjusting their strategies based on what they see, guided by some sort of rationale for choosing which strategy to employ in different circumstances.
    2. Mindfully empirical: Mindfully empirical educators think about how they can get the maximum amount of useful diagnostic information from day-to-day course work. They design their courses with a goal of creating many feedback loops that enable them to be adjust their teaching to the needs of the students.
    3. Meta-cognitively empirical: Meta-cognitively empirical educators are empirical not only about how they use their existing bag of tricks but also about which tricks they should have and how effective those tricks really are. They consciously and regularly test their own assumptions about effective teaching, and they are open to trying new appropaches. My read of Lauren Herckis’ research is that the barrier of moving from mindfully empirical to meta-cognitively empirical (and to the next level, socially empirical) is where a lot of the difficult work needs to be done. Lots of educators are intuitively empirical, and the transition from there to mindfully empirical is not a huge leap. Getting them to test and challenge their deeply held beliefs about what constitutes effective teaching is a lot harder.
    4. Socially empirical: Socially empirical educators view effective teaching not as an individual art but as a shared pool of knowledge and experience that everyone can learn from and contribute to. They seek out common vocabulary, methods, and standards of proof so that they can learn with their colleagues and raise the collective bar. This is the beginning of disciplinarity.

    One possible defining purpose of “open education” is fostering socially empirical education. We can learn together and teach each other, teacher to teacher, teacher to student, student to student, and student to teacher. We can collectively learn how to teach and learn more effectively. We can conduct experiments, check each other’s work, and develop shared notions of what constitutes “evidence” of effective education. With this formulation of open education, as with the others, an open license is not a necessity; it’s an affordance. But substantial kinds of openness are essential to socially empirical education. You can’t build a shared body of knowledge without sharing.

    The strategy of having students collaboratively construct knowledge artifacts fits in with this ethos nicely. Students learn how to negotiate the development of shared understanding. Here again, I am endorsing a strategy, not a dogma. But by framing student creation of curricular content as “learning how to negotiate the development of shared understanding,” we take the motivation for the educational activity out of the realm of say, social constructivism, which individual instructors may or may not buy into, and reframe it as a life skill that all humans should have. Doing this will help more instructors better understand why, when, and possibly even how they might want to utilize the strategy of having students co-create curricular materials.

    Framing open education in terms of socially empirical education is intended to be a provocation rather than an argument. Since I am a critical friend of the open education community rather than a member of it, I don’t really get a vote. But I hope that the notion of socially empirical education can enrich the conversation among proponents of open education.

  • Empirical Educators Define the Project

    In my last post, I wrote that the Empirical Educator Project (EEP) is e-Literate’s way of putting our money where our mouth is, so to speak, regarding our own theory of change for improving student success and closing achievement gaps. What is that theory? I articulated it in some detail last February, before our inaugural summit.

    But it was just a theory then. After one day at the summit, we asked participants to volunteer their own views about what EEP is and why it might be valuable. We created a four-part interview series, which can be found here. But I want to highlight a few points from the interviews that have convinced us that we are onto something.

    Let me start by articulating that theory as simply as I can:

    Many, many educators are already working hard on meeting student success challenges, but they are often doing it in isolation. If we can introduce the right people to each other and get them talking to each other about the student success challenges they are working on, then good stuff will happen.

    That’s it. That’s the whole enchilada.

    Here it is in a little more detail:

    1. Many educators at many institutions—including both universities and the companies that serve them—feel personally responsible for improving student success and are actively testing ideas and learning lessons about how to do so.
    2. Social barriers often prevent these lessons learned from being shared, tested, and built upon.
    3. One of the biggest barriers is the difficulty of finding collaborators who are motivated to work on the same problem and have complementary capabilities for doing so.
    4. One major reason that potential collaborators don’t find each other is because they live in different peer networks and don’t naturally cross paths.
    5. If we can make it easier for those people to find each other, then they will do great things together, even without a lot of external funding or organizational support.
    6. Once people from different peer networks collaborate on a project, the results will tend to propagate in all of the participants’ respective networks.
    7. If we do this enough, then lasting bridges will begin to form among currently isolated networks and the pace of sector-wide progress will accelerate.

    Here’s how we are testing the idea in EEP’s first year:

    1. We made a list of people across the higher education sector who we know are doing great work and are good collaborators.
    2. We trimmed the list down to a manageably small group that was spread across different peer networks. (Most of the summit participants told us they knew fewer than half of the other attendees.)
    3. We raised enough money to get the group into the same room for a day and a half, and to provide some light follow-up.
    4. We spent our time together at the summit encouraging folks to get to know each other, share what they are working on, and look for project collaborators.
    5. Post-summit, we are watching to see whether collaborative projects happen and are lightly facilitating where we can.

    From the beginning, we viewed this very much as an experiment and honestly didn’t know how much we would be able to accomplish with a group of strangers in less than two days. We were absolutely blown away by what happened.

    Do yourself a favor. Take a little under eight minutes and listen to what these participants had to say about our theory of change after just one day of talking to each other:

    It’s fairly easy to get a group of smart people together in a room and have them walk away feeling like they had a good, satisfying intellectual conversation about what might or could be done. It’s a lot harder to get them excited about a common, complex goal, with grand ambitions and a sense of how those ambitions might be met. If you didn’t watch the whole video above, then just listen to this bit from Duke University’s Bridgette Martin Hard about what she described as “one of the biggest, loftiest goals that I see being possible [for EEP]:

    Culture change. For the entire sector. There it is. The whole enchilada. After one day of discussion.

    OK, discussion, is nice, but is anything actually going to happen? Well, here is a sampling of participants talking about some of the project ideas that emerged from the summit—again, after just one day of being together:

    Every person in that room said they had at least one collaborative project idea they had seriously discussed and thought had a realistic chance of actively happening. Some had as many as three projects.

    That was after one day. What about now, three months later? I am in the process of compiling the first project update for the group. (We’ll keep these updates private to the group until each group of collaborators decides they have made enough collective progress to share their work more broadly. So far, I have about a dozen substantive updates from project teams, and I know for a fact that I have not received updates from all the groups that have engaged in post-summit work on their projects. This all sprung out of one brief gathering with about fifty people who largely didn’t know each other and have decided to move ahead with collaborative work despite the fact that they are getting zero grant money for the projects. The problem isn’t lack of motivation for change; it’s the barriers. In a variety of ways that I’ll explore in future posts, the match-making that is happening in EEP lowers various barriers—yes, the social barrier I talked about up front, but resource barriers as well. (There are hints of this in the videos above.)

    There is no longer any question for us about whether we will continue EEP after this first year. We believe that some of these projects will be ready to come out of stealth mode by the fall, with more going public by the end of the calendar year. We are slowly and carefully adding new members to the cohort and expect to expand it more substantially in the spring of 2019, when we have our next summit. We are also exploring ideas for broader outreach, along the lines of Bridgette’s thinking above. We’ll have more to say about this in the fall.

     

  • Disclosure Update

    Regular readers know that we try to be as transparent as we can about the funding sources of our business, particularly when those sources are from organizations that we write about. This is an update about our relationship with a long-term funding source for e-Literate: The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF).

    We have been fortunate to receive a few grants from the foundation over the last few years. They funded coverage of digital education in general and personalized learning in particular. To their credit, the foundation staff consistently respected our editorial independence. Further, their support enabled us to create content that we hope will have enduring value. Here are a few examples:

    • Our piece defining the value of “personalized learning” in EDUCAUSE Review
    • Our analysis of the nuances behind SRI’s adaptive learning report in The Chronicle of Higher Education
    • Our animated explainers on various personalized learning concepts, like this one on memory-based adaptive learning:

    • Our case studies delving into the details of adaptive and personalized learning, like this one on the value of technology to make student activity more visible:

    From a mission perspective, we share BMGF’s aspiration to provide everyone with a quality education and, in particular, to close achievement gaps. But we are rethinking how we can be most effective at contributing to the achievement of those aspirations. Partly because of our grant work and our broader participation in the foundation’s network of grantees, we have learned some lessons about what does and doesn’t work in terms of promoting effective practices. Over time, we have developed our own theory of change.

    We have decided to put our money where our mouth is and form the Empirical Educator Project to test our theory. As a consequence of our commitment to and focus on this new effort, we have decided not to pursue another round of funding from BMGF for e-Literate’s continued participation within the foundation’s Digital Learning Solutions Network. Making this decision also enables us to advance another of our goals, which is to decrease our financial dependence on any particular influencer in the market—particularly when it comes to direct funding of our reporting and analysis.

    We wish the foundation staff and grantee network the best of luck in their pursuit of our mutual goals and hope to find other ways in which we can collaborate with them over time as we work toward our mutual aspirations for higher education.

  • Textbook Authors Sue over Cengage Unlimited Royalties

    Textbook Authors Sue over Cengage Unlimited Royalties

    Back in January, I wrote of Cengage’s “all you can eat” Unlimited pricing announcement:

    We don’t know whether Cengage will be a winner from this strategy, but we do know who will be the losers: textbook authors. Cengage, of course, denies this. Cengage CTO George Moore, when asked about the contract renegotiations with the authors to make this fly, said only that “Cengage renegotiates contracts with authors all time.” Michael Hansen claimed that Cengage’s interests and their authors are aligned, and that their authors are all very concerned about the affordability of textbooks.

    Really?

    In February of 2015, Greg Mankiw—Cengage’s blockbuster economics textbook author who has made literally millions of dollars from his relationship with Cengage—expressed perplexity at the The New York Times’ call for less expensive textbooks:

    To me, this reaction seems strange. After all, the Times is a for-profit company in the business of providing information. If it really thought that some type of information (that is, textbooks) was vastly overpriced, wouldn’t the Times view this as a great business opportunity? Instead of merely editorializing, why not enter the market and offer a better product at a lower price? The Times knows how to hire writers, editors, printers, etc. There are no barriers to entry in the textbook market, and the Times starts with a pretty good brand name.

    My guess is that the Times business managers would not view starting a new textbook publisher as an exceptionally profitable business opportunity, which if true only goes to undermine the premise of its editorial writers.

    Given that Mankiw was name-checked in the Cengage Unlimited announcement press release, management must have worked something out with him to keep him happy. We are hearing whispers from the company’s competitors that not all authors were given such an opportunity and that lawsuits may follow. We’ll see whether that bears out. Regardless, though, this model does fundamentally change the relationship that the publisher has with its authors. With buffet-style pricing at a low rental price point, a model like Cengage Unlimited is likely to do to textbook authors what Spotify and other music subscription services did to musicians. There may still be a handful of superstar authors whose books are such outsized hits that they can still command royalties and large advances. But the vast majority of authors will see their income shrink. They either will get smaller royalty agreements or will be paid once on a fee-for-services basis so that the company can own the content outright. My guess is that there will be a lot more of the latter than the former. Keep in mind that copyright negotiations for a textbook or textbook-equivalent involve more than just the author(s). There may be literally hundreds of permissions to track for photographs, videos, animations, and so on. To the degree that “good enough” wins out over “better enough”, publishers will be under strong pressure to own as much of their content outright as they can.

    Today’s Inside Higher Ed headline: Textbook Authors Sue Cengage Over Subscription Model.

    To be clear, I don’t know if, contractually, this lawsuit has merit or what is likely to happen with this particular suit. But the handwriting is on the wall. If textbook prices come down, then textbook royalties also have to come down.

    Regardless, all of this is transitional. As students are asking, “Why should we pay all this money for content that is increasingly available online for free?”, textbook publishers are asking themselves the same question. Rights management is an expensive nightmare for them. Their businesses would be much more manageable if they could use either OER, fee-for-service content that they own outright, or both. Their biggest challenge is that faculty are used to using a particular textbook and may have some attachment to the particular author. If the publishers replace that book with one that doesn’t have all of those royalty entanglements, then faculty are more likely to look around at competitors’ offerings since, hey, if they have to rework their class for a book anyway, they might as well look around. If it weren’t for that problem, I suspect that publishers would be swapping out titles more quickly.