e-Literate

Present is Prologue

Category: Strategy & Change Management

  • Before We Turn Over Curriculum To Apple And Amazon . . .

    Before We Turn Over Curriculum To Apple And Amazon . . .

    Recently I have been interviewed twice by EdSurge regarding education initiatives by the Big Five tech companies (Amazon and Apple, specifically). The first interview centered on iPads for all and Swift programming initiative at the Ohio State University.

    Hill believes Apple’s main motivation to do this collaboration with Ohio State was to sell devices.

    “The way I sort of look at them, Apple is like the Godot of education, where they’re the world’s largest company, and people keep waiting for them to do something meaningful in education, and not just sell devices, but actually get involved in education, change the game somehow,” says Hill.

    That has been a pattern with Apple, he argues, pointing to a big iPod program at Duke University in the early 2000s, which many see as failing to live up to the hype, or the failed iPad program at Los Angeles Unified School District more recently.

    Beyond the device sales, however, the more significant part of the initiative centered on programming skills:

    [The Apple / OSU collaboration] seeks to “integrate learning technology throughout the university experience,” an iOS design laboratory and opportunities for students to learn coding skills to make the ready for a career in the “app economy.”

    This plan is based on Apple’s “Everyone Can Code” initiative that sets up labs and a curriculum to teach students to program in Swift, Apple’s app language primarily designed for iOS, tvOS, watchOS, and macOS (although there are a small number cases of using it for Windows and Android). Just two weeks after the Ohio State news, Apple announced that “Australia’s RMIT Joins More Than 20 International Universities in Adopting Apple Curriculum”.

    Apple today announced the global expansion of its Everyone Can Code initiative to more than 20 colleges and universities outside of the US. These schools will now offer the App Development with Swift Curriculum, a full-year course designed by Apple engineers and educators to teach coding and app design to students of all levels and backgrounds. Now hundreds of thousands of students from around the world gain the opportunity to become proficient in the Swift programming language and build the fundamental skills they need to pursue careers in the booming app economy.

    In a second interview with EdSurge, I was asked about recent support from Amazon giving away Echo devices and promoting Alexa.

    In August, Amazon gifted 1,600 Echo Dots to engineering students at Arizona State University living in a new dorm. John German, an ASU spokesperson, said at the time that the university’s motivation was to develop an opportunity for its engineering students to get skills in the “emerging field” of voice technology. An Amazon spokesperson explained in August that Amazon officials imagine a world where their devices are entwined in student life.

    To push these efforts further, Amazon launched the Alexa Prize, a research competition where university teams developing new ideas for conversational artificial intelligence can get monetary prizes. A team from the University of Washington won the 2017 competition, getting $500,000. Applications are now open for the 2018 competition.

    My comments on the combination of moves by Apple and Amazon:

    For Phil Hill, an edtech consultant and blogger at e-Literate, it’s no surprise that big tech companies want college graduates to be familiar, if not well-versed, with their tools. He says these companies want to fill the gap “between traditional corporate training and higher education,” creating a “tighter connection” between students getting a college degree and an initial job with the needed skills.

    It’s not a new endeavor by any means. Hill remembers that in the 1980s, Sun Microsystems provided workstations for university students. The company’s business plan explicitly stated under its marketing approach to put “SUN workstations into selected universities to gain visibility.” The idea, says Hill, was to get people “sort of hooked on using Unix” and programming skills that could be used in the workforce.

    Sun also worked closely with schools to establish physical training centers. In 1999 the company and the University of Pittsburgh opened an “Academic Java Center” meant to train and certify students in Java technology.

    Beyond showing my age, what I wanted to highlight with the SUN comments is that there has been a big change in tech industry that colleges and universities should be cautious about. The big five tech companies operate on closed ecosystems, with custom programming languages, custom devices, and proprietary platforms. Whereas the focus on Java in the 80s and 90s enabled students to learn a general-purpose language that could run on any number of platforms, Swift is primarily for the Apple devices, and Alexa is for Echo. Company-specific languages and technology.

    The initiatives from Apple and Amazon are not just to give out freebies, they intend to get more students learning their proprietary languages and coming out of college with skills applicable to their closed ecosystems. Also mentioned by EdSurge is an initiative from Google to promote its virtual reality platform Daydream. These efforts specifically include designing curricula for higher education institutions to adopt.

    Perhaps it would be useful to compare these recent initiatives with the Cisco Networking Academy, which provides curriculum and support for 9,500 schools and over 1 million students worldwide that “identifies and develops the skills people and businesses need to thrive in a digital economy”. ((Disclosure: Cisco is a past client of MindWires, our consulting business, including advice on Networking Academy. Amazon is also a past client.)) The Networking Academy also includes Cisco hardware and software as part of their package, and there is a focus on Cisco-specific platforms.

    One difference, however, is that the Networking Academy can lead to general-purpose certifications in addition to Cisco-specific ones, including those for C, C++, Linux, and CompTIA entry-level computer installation.

    What we see here is an evolution of big-tech support for colleges and universities that mirrors the general tech industry migration from more-open to more-closed ecosystems. Higher education institutions need to be fully aware of and cautious of these changes, as the more recent efforts lose most of the general-purpose educational outcomes and encourage students to move into a closed ecosystem. An Ohio State U graduate of the future who has gone through the Everyone Can Code curriculum will be much more likely to remain an iOS app programmer than an Android programmer, for example. This means that the schools entering into the new partnerships are tying themselves much more closely with specific companies than was the case in the past.

    There are real benefits to these initiatives (even though the iPads for all benefits are overblown), but these decisions should not be taken lightly just for the promise of free stuff. There are real implications to tying curriculum to specific company ecosystems. And maybe schools would do well to insist that these partnerships include support for alternative languages and more general-purpose learning outcomes.

    Update 12/30: Clarified language that while Swift is primarily designed for Apple devices, it can be used in cases for others. See comments below for additional info.

  • Cengage Unlimited – Marketing ploy or significant change in strategy?

    Cengage Unlimited – Marketing ploy or significant change in strategy?

    One week ago Cengage announced Unlimited, an all-you-can-read subscription for their digital course materials. For $120 per academic term, students get access to any and all of Cengage’s 20,000 digital titles with the ability to also get a print rental for $7.99 (shipping costs) per title. Once the subscription ends, students keep access to up to six digital textbooks for another year at no additional cost.

    When interviewed for an Inside Higher Ed article, I commented:

    Phil Hill, the co-publisher of the blog e-Literate and a partner at MindWires Consulting, said that he was “impressed” by the Cengage announcement. “It’s like someone at Cengage woke up and decided to take this digital content transformation seriously,” he said. “If you combine Cengage Unlimited with the OpenNow announcement, both of them really represent a rethinking of Cengage’s business model.” While Cengage and other publishers have dipped their toes into digital-first models, Cengage is “taking the lead,” he said.

    To me this is big news – a real change in business model from one of the big three academic publishers in higher education. Publishers have long suffered from their own historical success in two key areas. One is the restrictive content licensing terms that have restricted student and faculty to narrow usage while also restricting the publisher based on author rights. The other is the business model that treats content as a scarce resource, leading to high unit costs (the $300+ textbook) and a focus on top-line revenue. Both issues make it difficult for the publishers to rethink models and take advantage of digital content to address growing concerns on affordability, but Cengage Unlimited appears to represent a rethinking of how to get past these barriers and bet on future usage patterns.

    Initially, the main person who seemed to throw cold water on this interpretation was Cengage’s own CEO Michael Hansen from comments also at IHE.

    While Hansen said that the announcement of Cengage Unlimited was significant, he said he didn’t think it represented a big shift in strategy for the company.

    This comment confused me. Is Cengage Unlimited a marketing ploy rather than a significant change in strategy? The Netflix of Textbooks usage in national media certainly adds to the skepticism.

    Michael and I had the opportunity to interview CEO Hansen along with EVP and Chief Product Officer Fernando Bleichmar last week. Both Hansen and Bleichmar were quite direct in answering our questions, and I came away reassured that this move does represent a significant change in strategy that goes beyond what we have seen from academic publishers in the past.

    When asked about how to read interpret his comments, Hansen replied that “nothing changes and everything changes”. What doesn’t change is that the executive team believes digital experience is better experience for students. They have built products over five years that they believe serve this purpose, and Cengage have set a strategic goal of being 90 percent digital by 2019.

    What has changed is that Cengage executives now fully recognize that affordability is a barrier for students. According to Hansen, while faculty tend to appreciate the better learning experience possible through digital technology, “we in the industry have put our heads in the sand on affordability”, thinking students and faculty would ‘see the beauty’ of what publishers produce and be willing to pay higher prices. Yet Bleichmar pointed out that 70% of students are not using digital, largely due to affordability.

    From our perspective, publishers have in general recognized the problem of affordability and have made efforts to reduce prices particularly through digital offerings. Cengage Unlimited, however, is the first time a publisher has made affordability the centerpiece of their strategy -both in business model and in branding.

    There will be real implications to the changes due to Unlimited. One is that it will now be very difficult for Cengage to get more than a handful of students paying for $200 or $300 textbooks. The $120 price along with print rental option should place a cap on what it makes sense to spend on any one book, particularly for general education courses. Take the infamous Greg Mankiw’s Principle of Economics textbook. Currently the MindTap (digital platform) access for six months costs $130, and if you add the bound book it costs $355. If Cengage Unlimited is successful, the days are over when the publisher can get these unit prices. There will also be a cap on what Cengage can make with multiple digital offerings. Bleichmar acknowledged that Cengage would have to make up in volume what they are giving up in price-per-unit.

    A recent model that several publishers have been trying lately is ‘inclusive access’ as described by Inside Higher Ed just a month ago.

    Major education publishers — including Pearson, Cengage and McGraw-Hill Education — report that the number of colleges offering “inclusive-access” programs has grown rapidly in recent years. Where previously students might have been assigned textbooks individually, now many institutions are signing up whole classes of students to automatically receive digital course materials at a discounted rate, rather than purchasing individually. The “inclusive” aspect of the model means that every student has the same materials on the first day of class, with the charge included as part of their tuition.

    According to Hansen and Bleichmar, Unlimited is a much bigger deal than inclusive access, moving from à la carte to a all-you-can-eat model. Cengage will offer both, but they believe Unlimited will have a bigger impact on affordability.

    There is absolutely short-term risk involved in this move, but Hansen pointed out that this risk should be compared to that of the current trajectory. “The risk of doing nothing is much higher than what we’re facing right now” without a change.

    Cengage’s short video on YouTube actually plays to this idea that Unlimited represents a change from the past, no longer seeing previous boundaries as limitations to live within. Yes, it’s marketing material, but in this case I believe it represents the thinking of a company coming up with new strategies.

    Will this model work? That we do not know. One factor to consider is that college textbook adoption has never been a rational model. The consumer (student) has had limited ability to choose products based on affordability, even if that situation has changed somewhat with rental and used book options, piracy, and the choice to not acquire required course materials. In addition, the ability to find different options is typically tricky and requires time and know-how. It would be a mistake to think that even if Unlimited represents a rational better choice students will automatically jump at the chance. Furthermore, open educational resources (OER) have made real inroads recently and represent even lower-cost options (often free, often $25 per textbook when bundled in platform).

    What I do feel confident about is that Cengage is making a big bet with a new model that is more significant than ‘inclusive access’ or previous attempts from publishers to go digital. This is not just a marketing ploy, it’s a change in strategy driven by new understanding of affordability concerns.

    Update: Cengage no longer goes by Cengage Learning. Post edited accordingly.

  • Unizin Updates: A change in direction and a likely change in culture

    Unizin Updates: A change in direction and a likely change in culture

    After the resignation of Unizin’s CEO (Amin Qazi) and COO (Robin Littleworth) that we reported last week, we can confirm that the key issue was a change in direction for the consortium driven by the board of directors. Our information is based on on-the-record interviews with Qazi and Littleworth and additional interviews with Unizin staff, member institution staff, and outside sources. We believe this change in direction led to the resignations and will likely also lead to a change in emphasis on various Unizin initiatives.

    To recap what happened last week and add some details, there were two back-to-back board meetings for Unizin and Kuali held in Austin, TX. These meetings were not emergency meetings and were scheduled a long time ago, based on Unizin’s headquarters and Kuali’s users conference being held in that city. In an interview and follow-up discussion over the past few days, Amin Qazi described how he had not expected to resign going into the week. But in a meeting last Monday with the executive committee of Unizin, the board described a change in direction that they wanted to make, focusing on investments in initiatives with shorter-term visibility instead of those with a longer-term payoff such as the Open edX and Google partnerships. Qazi said that he was not the right person to lead the company in that direction, and after this meeting he resigned.

    I was told that Monday night Rob Lowden, Associate Vice President of Enterprise Systems at Indiana University, was asked to fly down to Austin based on this resignation. At the Tuesday Unizin board meeting, they approved his selection as interim executive director while the board searches for a new CEO. Robin Littleworth described that he was told somewhat conflicting information in his meeting with the board in that there was no change in direction.

    Coming out of the the board meeting, there was an all-hands meeting with Unizin staff, and board members told them of the changes. There was a question about rumors that Kuali.co might be acquiring Unizin, and the board members stated that this rumor was not true. Later in the meeting Littleworth gave an impassioned speech that the staff was the company, and that due to the changes and how they were handled the board had seriously harmed the company culture. He then announced his resignation. According to Littleworth, he hopes that his resignation and speech might alert the board that they didn’t think the situation all the way through and that they should reconsider how to support the company moving forward. Rob Lowden, for his part, still has his full-time job at Indiana University, but he told staff during this meeting that he would be commuting weekly to Austin for the next several months during the transition.

    I suspect that we’ll need to analyze the change in direction in more depth as details come out, but I believe that this situation is not based on finances or problems getting member institutions to recommit; rather it is a matter of emphasis on shorter-term versus longer-term initiatives.

    All Unizin member institutions that signed on in 2014 have re-signed to new three-year agreements, and according to Unizin Form 990 submissions, the consortium had $2 million in assets as of summer 2016 while running a surplus – meaning that this balance is should be even higher today. Furthermore, Littleworth stated that the Unizin management team was “not given any indication from our Board, let alone anything in writing, that we were at all underperforming or not meeting expectations”.

    What Qazi and Littleworth were pushing for were initiatives that directly addressed member institution needs even though they may take time to develop. One example is the recently-announced Open edX partnership. In an interview with Thomas Evans at The Ohio State University, he described that school’s desire to explore micro-credentials and to figure out how that would fit into an overall OSU strategy. Despite OSU’s partnership with Coursera, or actually because of it, the school did not want to figure this out with a platform company that would take a percentage of revenue. The Unizin / Open edX agreement is allowing OSU to pilot programs and figure out a strategy over the next few years.

    What we are likely to see with the Unizin change in direction is a stronger emphasis on partnerships and developments focused on near-term positioning of the consortium, include the BNED LoudCloud analytics partnership.

    The key intellectual property that Unizin has developed over the past few years is the Unizin Data Platform with its associated Unizin Common Data Model (UCDM). From a post on the UCDM:

    The UCDM rules map student, course, instruction, and learning activity information together. They solve the problem of “connecting the dots” between all of the data sources to create a single view of the student in the context of learning. As the data flows in from the SIS, LMS, and learning tools, the rules are applied to each data element, like a puzzle piece, to make sure that it is oriented to contribute to the whole picture.

    We at e-Literate have been critical of Unizin over the years for not having a clear value proposition. But from my conversations over the past two years with Unizin member institutions, the biggest value thus far from the consortium was this data platform and the hard work done to turn messy LMS and SIS data into usable formats. We have also heard from two outside sources recently that Unizin has had some real success using Engage to provide Inclusive Access digital content (course content available day one of term through institutional agreements) to several schools. And the OSU description of why they are using Open edX is compelling with its alignment with the stated Unizin mission.

    We don’t know all the details of the change in direction, but we believe this change is what triggered the management resignations last week. I will be quite interested to see if the changes affect the three initiatives mentioned above and pull the organization backwards in terms of creating value for its member institutions.

    Given the change, however, I believe there will also be a corresponding change in company culture that is inevitable at Unizin. Qazi and Littleworth (I have had many more interactions with the former but believe both to have been aligned) had an open, transparent, collegial style. Rather than ever getting defensive from questions we have asked or posts we have written at e-Literate, the two departing Unizin executives went out of their way to listen to criticism, engage us in conversations, and not try and control messaging but favor transparency instead.

    Qazi described how he was honored to have had the responsibility to guide Unizin through hard three years of launching the company, and he is proud of the team that Unizin has – they have a great deal of passion and dedication, and they have been asked to solve some very different problems from universities. Littleworth also expressed his primary pride in the Unizin staff and what they are accomplishing.

    By way of contrast, we have found the Unizin board to be quite focused on controlling the message. The board specifically asked both Qazi and Littleworth to not talk to me, but given their lack of employment agreements controlling who they talked to, both declined. I have asked to speak to board members for this story over the past few days with no response until they put out a press release today. The press release thanked Qazi for his service in a classy way and briefly noted Lowden’s new role while not mentioning Littleworth. But there is no information that I did not already have. After the press release came out I was invited, not by a board member but by a communications specialist, to submit questions for the board to address. I will do so for follow-up analysis.

    There is little doubt in my mind that the new Unizin leadership will be much more tightly controlled by the Unizin board, and they will take on much more of the board’s characteristics. This will likely lead to a change in company culture.

    Where does this leave Unizin? The consortium has money and three-year agreements in place. But there is a lot of work to be done before the consortium can deliver the value justifying $250k – $427k per year membership fees. As Littleworth described, the company is still in its infancy but now is changing direction while missing its critical leadership.

    While the following is not based on my interviews, I find the choice of Lowden as interim executive director to be quite interesting and a big part of the reason that I believe the ‘change in direction’ argument. If the board truly wanted to continue same direction despite Amin’s resignation, why not promote Steve Scott (CTO) or Robin Littleworth (COO), at least during transition? Remember that Littleworth did not resign until after Lowden was selected, and there was no discussion with the former COO about what to do next. Bringing in someone from outside so quickly seems to be significant. Furthermore, Lowden has a long history at Indiana University working for Unizin co-founder Brad Wheeler, and he was also involved early on at Sakai and then with the Kuali board – initiatives heavily influenced by Wheeler. Given his full-time job, the choice to use Lowden to replace full-time executive team for the next several months will lead to a challenging situation at a crucial time, to say the least, even though Qazi is staying on board through December to help with the transition. Was this choice partially worked out in advance, or did the board really react to Qazi’s resignation and find an interim replacement within 24 hours? What will Lowden be able to accomplish given his logistical challenges (Indianapolis vs. Austin and having multiple jobs). I will attempt to get answers from board on these questions.

    What I would watch over the next few months is whether Unizin loses additional staff due to the changes. And I would also watch the direction of the Unizin Data Platform in particular to understand the extent of changes to strategy.

  • Big Changes at Unizin: CEO and COO resign after board meeting

    Big Changes at Unizin: CEO and COO resign after board meeting

    Three and a half years after its formation, Unizin is facing its biggest challenge. Now that the consortium is dealing with contract renewals (membership based on three-year agreements), and now that it is a standalone organization and not wrapped under Internet2, Unizin will face the future without its top management.

    There’s a lot more here than just a change of one or two executives, and we plan to share more analysis next week here at e-Literate. We have also reached out to get comments from the various people involved. For now, however, here are the basics.

    This week there were two board meetings in Austin, TX – one for Unizin and one for Kuali – due to the logistics of having several people serving on both boards. We have confirmed based on multiple sources that after a meeting with the Unizin executive committee but before the board meeting, CEO Amin Qazi turned in his resignation. One day later, after the board approved a new interim CEO, COO Robin Littleworth turned in his resignation.

    The interim CEO is Rob Lowden, Associate VP Enterprise Systems at Indiana University and long-time active member of the Kuali community and prior to that in the Sakai community (including board positions in those two open source organizations). To the best of my knowledge, Lowden will remain in his job at IU while at the same time running Unizin until the board selects new executives.

    Expect more from us next week.

    Update: Clarified timing of resignation.

  • WCET: Clarity into the successful transition of UF Online

    WCET: Clarity into the successful transition of UF Online

    At this year’s annual meeting for WCET, I was on a panel, along with EdSurge’s Jeff Young, moderated by Saint Leo University’s Jeff Borden. Kicking off the panel, Borden framed the discussion partially as learning from those outside academia. Even though I am not an academic, I have found myself making the mistake of a bias against outsiders. Almost two and a half years ago I described the emerging disaster of University of Florida Online (UF Online) – reality was exposing fundamentally flawed enrollment estimates based on institutional and vendor hubris. In this post I described another challenge:

    In the midst of the challenging startup, UF Online had to deal with the premature departure of the initial executive director. After a one-year search process, UF Online chose a new leader who has absolutely no experience in online education.

    That was probably the fifth edit of a paragraph that started closer to “UF Online somehow thought a bureaucrat from EPA should be its new leader. Next up: filling the VP of student support with DMV veteran.” I was wrong – it turns out that choosing an outsider was just what the program needed.

    Further down in the post I noted:

    At this point, it might have been worth stepping back and challenging some of the original assumptions.

    By late 2016, however, I noted a “remarkable transformation at UF Online” and how the unit shed the hubris of the initial plans and really did challenged original assumptions and came up with a new strategy.

    At another WCET session, this same UF Online executive director Evie Cummings provided more insight into the mindset that led to this transformation. Prior to coming to UF Online, Cummings was instrumental in creating and establishing the EPA Information Quality Guidelines and much of the focus was on transparency and accuracy of information shared with the public. This mindset has been brought to the University of Florida, not only leading to an honest reevaluation of original assumptions but also to what I consider exemplary public reporting on program and student outcomes at UF Online.

    Another mindset described in the session was the acceptance of those who control funding – board of governors and state legislators in this case – and figuring out how to use data and communication to bring them along into healthier decision-making.

    These approaches are evident in the UF Online annual report released earlier in the week.

    In terms of enrollment, UF Online not only reports current status and plans, but they choose not to whitewash the past. Their report shows the original plan, the revised plan, and current results with a healthy 34% year-over-year enrollment growth.

    One side benefit – I no longer need to update the spreadsheet I had been using to describe the same information.

    Further in the report, there is a description of UF Online’s new emphasis on creating community among online students and graduates.

    Launched in 2017, the UF Online Connections Program works to foster a thriving learning community across all online students, faculty, academic advisors, and staff. Coupled with strong academic programs, a vibrant and engaged online student experience assures UF Online students not only gain the skills they need but also the connections and network to support them after they graduate. This past year, the Connections program emphasized providing community and networking opportunities with key strategic in-person events.

    They have also launched what they call UF Plaza, a virtual campus to help create social engagement, peer collaboration, and general support groups. Structures outside of the classroom focused on helping online students feel connected.

    One of my previous criticisms was the creation of Pathway to Campus Enrollment (PaCE) – automatic enrollment offers for qualified students who did not get into the main University of Florida as traditional students, with option to transition from online to campus for upper division coursework. When PaCE kicked off, the effort seemed focused mostly on institutional rather than student needs, and students were unprepared for the offer and decision. There was no provision to explain the program and help students decide if they should consider the online option.

    Now UF Online offers a mandatory PaCE Preview:

    This consists of a full day of informational sessions followed by one-on-one sessions with an advisor and concluding with first semester registration.

    They have also added remote site visits:

    We Come to You help sessions: For the first time, in March 2017, UF provided a local site visit in Coral Gables, FL to answer questions about PaCE and help students and their families to make an informed decision.

    Given that PaCE students are a different group – they did not initially apply to be an online student – it makes sense that UF Online now reports fall-to-fall persistence data for non-PaCE and PaCE student groups. And they even give a breakdown by academic program and updated status of the PaCE students who enrolled in 2015.

    There are also detailed financials, showing that UF Online is currently bringing in $6.3 m of tuition revenue and $5.0 m of state subsidies and spending $12.5 m.

    UF Online still has challenges – improving persistence rates, getting to break-even financials, etc. And they are not the only online program with this level of success. What makes UF Online so interesting to watch is that they made some hard choices to get past faulty original planning assumptions, they are very transparent in sharing their information publicly, and this is a very positive case of higher education embracing and learning from an outsider.

  • WGU Audit: Likely impacts for fragile movement of competency-based education

    WGU Audit: Likely impacts for fragile movement of competency-based education

    One issue that almost all observers seem to agree upon is that the Department of Education is unlikely to accept the Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG’s) recommendations to declare Western Governors University (WGU) a provider of correspondence courses and to force the school to pay back more than $700 million in Title IV funds. It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss the audit findings that attempted to add new interpretations of distance education requirements for “regular and substantive interaction”, a topic I mentioned on Friday.

    One important variable in this equation is timing – how long will the ED take to review the audit findings and make official decisions on adopting or rejecting the recommendations? Based on history, the decision could take years, as described by Michael Goldstein, lawyer at Cooley LLP in a WCET post by Russ Poulin:

    The IG’s report and recommendations go to Federal Student Aid, which decides what, if any, action should be taken. (The “if any” is directly from the IG transmittal.) That involves a further, and often lengthy, review process. The ultimate decision authority is the Secretary.

    I’m not counting on institutional leaders using the argument “I’m not worried, Betsy DeVos has my back”. The longer the review process drags on, the bigger the impact.

    Another important variable is the extent to which the ED will reject the findings – will they reject the audit in its entirety and take no action, or will they accept some of the findings? Keep in mind that the argument about WGU providing self-paced courses and rejecting the institution’s claims to be a term-based institution are much stronger than the argument behind the OIG’s arbitrary interpretation of regular and substantive interaction.

    Impact on Big CBE Programs

    The impact on WGU itself is most likely a matter of whether perception drives enrollment down. WGU clearly spent a lot of time and effort this summer preparing their web site to deal with the fall out. The central theme is to attempt to reassure current and prospective students that WGU “students, graduates, and employers of our graduates can rest assured that WGU’s accreditation and financial aid eligibility are intact”.

    Students don’t follow all the details of political maneuvering and and even less of OIG audit reviews, but the perception that WGU’s status as a qualified distance education provider is at risk, therefore making the value of the degrees and likelihood of financial aid at risk, will add a barrier to enrollment decisions. I don’t suspect WGU can sweep this under the rug – they will have to go public as they have done with web site and hit this topic head on.

    In my estimation, however, this will be a matter of a reduction in WGU’s enrollment growth, or possibly a drop, and not an existential problem for them. WGU has a 20-year history, more than 83,000 students, full institutional commitment to fight this audit in public, and a lot of clout in Washington with bipartisan support of their model – a rarity these days.

    Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU) is also known for CBE, as their College for America got a lot of press over the past several years. What is not as well-known is that College for America, with its 8,000+ students, has been folded into the main operations of SNHU and its 100,000+ students, using the description of Workforce Partnerships. SNHU has less exposure than WGU to the audit for three reasons:

    • Obviously the audit was specifically on WGU and not SNHU.
    • CBE is all that WGU does, whereas SNHU has a fast-growing traditional online set of programs that provides the majority of its enrollment.
    • SNHU’s College for America is a business-to-business model, working directly with employers rather than being a consumer program targeting individual students as WGU does. It will be a lot easier to control the message and reassure partners in the B2B model.

    There could be some impact to SNHU and College for America, but again this is likely a manageable problem for these large schools.

    Impact on Everyone Else

    The bigger impact in my estimation will be on the other CBE programs in operation or in consideration, and this gets to the fragile movement comment.

    Both WGU and SNHU have gone all-in on CBE. They invested heavily in developing the models, they have worked with employers to understand needs, they already have thousands and thousands of students and are growing enrollment, and they are fully committed as an institution to the concept and implementation of full-fledged CBE and not just CBE-lite. But both schools are outliers in the broader CBE movement.

    A great deal of the perception of CBE is that there are “hundreds of schools” developing programs, often driven by a 2015 Public Agenda survey. What is happening in reality is that hundreds of schools are very cautiously dipping their toes in the CBE waters with no real commitment to make the model work, and they are only playing with courses and individual programs. Carl Straumsheim from Inside Higher Ed covered this situation in the spring, triggered by e-Literate news that Ellucian was dropping its CBE platform due to weak market demand:

    Last year, Ellucian partnered with the consulting and research firm Eduventures and the American Council on Education to survey 251 colleges on their competency-based education strategies. The survey identified one major reason why the competency-based education market may be a tricky one for vendors to build a profitable business model in: most colleges aren’t ready to go all in yet.

    The study found that only 7 percent of the colleges surveyed said they delivered most of their education using a competency-based model. Many more colleges said they were at the point of testing competency-based education in individual programs (18 percent) or courses (37 percent).

    For most of the CBE programs that I have seen, we’re dealing with dozens, or perhaps hundreds of students. The University of Wisconsin’s UW Flex program – one of the best known outside of WGU and SNHU – has only grown to 5 degree programs, 3 certificate programs, 1300 students in total, and $2.8 million in annual gross revenue. And the vast majority of programs are much smaller than that. Read the Eduventures 2016 report (the same one referenced by Ellucian in the IHE article) for additional perspective.

    Rather than a single, dominant version of CBE, our 2016 survey data reveals a diversity of practice across a spectrum of schools, each deploying and experimenting with CBE in order to meet specific institutional challenges. A portrait of CBE emerges as a menu of tools and practices, rather than a monolithic approach or linear path. These findings underscore the need for institutions to carefully weigh the pros and cons of CBE implementation, and to proactively select the CBE components that make the most sense for their students and mission.

    The challenge is that CBE calls for a new organizational model and a new pedagogical design in order to make it work, at least in a self-sustaining manner. It is great to see hundreds of schools experimenting with new methods to reach non-traditional students, but none of these programs will last if they do not get sufficient scale to justify the costs. But very few schools are even looking at how to get to thousands of students and determining what investment and organizational setup will be required to get there. This isn’t as simple as flipping a classroom or two.

    When you add in the WGU audit results, this challenge gets much harder to address. It will be much more difficult to justify investing in CBE programs or partnerships, or expanding beyond a pilot, when the audit provides marketing copy for those would resist CBE at traditional schools.

    California

    From the annals of bad timing comes this news from a week ago:

    The California Community Colleges’ Board of Governors today approved a new partnership with Western Governors University (WGU) that allows graduates of California’s 114 community colleges to transfer and seek their bachelor’s degree at a discount from the fully accredited, online institution.

    The agreement goes beyond pre-setting up transfers. It also is meant to encourage CCC students to move to WGU for their bachelor’s degree, where appropriate. There are terms for a 5% discount for CCC students, and there is a section on joint marketing.

    The CCCCO supports and will encourage CCCs to collaborate with WGU so that partnership
    information is available to students, faculty, and staff. WGU will also work in collaboration
    with the CCCCO to assist in dissemination of information to students, faculty, and staff at
    CCCs. CCCs will be encouraged to publicize locally the Chancellor’s Office support of this
    agreement, to inform students, faculty, and staff of the agreement’s benefits. Information will
    be encouraged through established internal CCC communication channels (such as
    student/employee newsletters, web sites pages, and listservs)

    This news comes at the same time as the active debate on the CCC system being directed to create a fully-online college serving non-traditional working adult students.

    These are dramatic proposals for the largest higher education system in the US, and there is bound to be plenty of opposition to such plans from faculty unions and other groups skeptical about changes in model.

    I suspect that the political climate in California just got a lot more difficult in terms of implementing both initiatives, and I suspect that the option lists available for setting up the new online college is shorter than it was last week.

    Reminder

    To be clear for those who have not read the first post, I consider the audit a travesty. The CBE movement and individual programs deserve scrutiny to ensure quality education for students, but this audit and its impact will do nothing useful to protect students or ensure quality.

    ((Full disclosure and Update: WGU is a past client of MindWires. Although we have no recent or pending relationship with WGU, since the topic was raised at Hack Education, I have added this disclosure. SNHU is a customer of our LMS market analysis service.))

  • WGU Audit Findings: Interpretations of “regular and substantive” and “self-paced”

    WGU Audit Findings: Interpretations of “regular and substantive” and “self-paced”

    The big news this week was the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at the Department of Education (ED) finding that Western Governors University (WGU) should be considered a correspondence provider instead of a distance education provider, and the school should return more than $700 million in Title IV federal funding programs. ((Full disclosure and Update: WGU is a past client of MindWires. Although we have no recent or pending relationship with WGU, since the topic was raised at Hack Education, I have added this disclosure.)) In short, being ruled a correspondence provider would mean that most student loans and Pell grants would not apply for WGU students and would all but shut down the institution or make it irrelevant. While the ED itself is unlikely to follow these non-binding recommendations, this ruling will have a big impact for years. More on that in tomorrow’s post. For now, the title loans for college students are the best option right now.

    It would be useful to first review the actual audit findings, especially since most media reporting focused mostly or solely on the issue of “regular and substantive interaction”, but the findings are broader and also encompass issues are self-paced vs. credit-hour / term-based education.

    The audit started over four years ago and primarily focused on 102 courses (out of 980) offered in the 2013 – 14 academic year. No one seems to know why the OIG started this audit, but the audit report itself makes it clear that quality was not the issue (page 6):

    we did not assess whether the school’s model was improving educational quality or expanding access to higher education.

    WGU’s regional accreditor,  Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities, has accredited WGU as a term-based distance education provider, including reaffirming the accreditation in February of this year. The Department of Education explicitly allowed WGU to be classified as a distance education provider as part of the Distance Education Demonstration Program from 1999 – 2005 and granted further waivers and agreements in April 2005.

    By my reading, the audit is a model of hyper-literal translation of ambiguous regulations, leading to three findings.

    • Finding 1) Course Offerings Met the Title IV Definition of a Correspondence Course, Not the Title IV Definition of Distance Education – This finding was centered on reviews of course materials for 69 courses as well as a mapping of WGU’s unbundled faculty role to traditional instructor definitions. The OIG found that using the courses did not meet the interpretation of regular and substantive interaction required of distance education courses.
    • Finding 2) Western Governors University Disbursed Title IV Funds to Students Before the Students Were Eligible to Receive the Funds – This finding was based on additional mapping of WGU’s CBE model to traditional term-based model. WGU itself decided to consider itself a term-based institution, mapping one competency unit to one credit hour over a 26-week academic term, and the ED recognized this classification in the 2005 agreement. The OIG, however, found that WGU should have been classified as a non-term school using self-paced programs. There are a different set of regulations for non-term programs.
    • Finding 3) Western Governors University Did Not Always Comply With the Requirements Governing the Return of Title IV Funds – This finding is important, but it deals with detailed bureaucratic rules upon student withdrawals. I’ll let someone else look at this finding.

    It is the combination of findings 1) and 2) that are important not just to WGU but to any school developing an online or hybrid non-lecture-based approach.

    Regular and Substantive Interaction

    WGU has been at the forefront of breaking apart the traditional faculty role, instead using mentors, evaluators, and other interdependent roles. The audit acknowledged that (page 15):

    Northwest Commission recognized Western Governors University’s student mentors, course mentors, evaluators, product managers, and council members as members of the school’s faculty. The accrediting agency also distinguished between the roles of student mentors and course mentors, characterizing student mentors as serving in academic advisory roles and course mentors serving in instructional roles.

    The OIG used a binary role-based approach (you are an instructor or you are not) leading to conclusion that only course mentors and evaluators could be considered as instructors, however. The basis of this determination was an instructor must “provide instruction on course content” – clearly a content-dissemination view that rejects alternative pedagogies. And this interpretation that the OIG treats as unambiguous is not based on law, regulations, or commonly-accepted educational terminology.

    The OIG looked at the ambiguous regulations and chose their own, very literal, interpretations (page 14):

    Because the HEA and Title IV regulations did not define instructor, substantive, or regular, we considered the ordinary meaning of those terms when assessing whether the school designed the 102 courses to offer regular and substantive interaction between students and instructors. We reviewed the school’s course design materials for evidence of interaction that was not primarily initiated by the student and was (1) with someone who instructs or provides knowledge about the subject matter of the course (instructor), (2) relevant to the subject matter (substantive), and (3) occurring with some reasonable frequency considering the school-suggested length of the course (regular).

    This is why I call the audit methodology as hyper-literal. Somehow the OIG thinks they can determine – without any disagreement or ambiguity – the “ordinary meaning of those terms” based on their own interpretations.

    Also note that the determination was entirely based on course design materials – think syllabus and course outlines. The OIG did not look at interactions arising during the course of actual course work, just whether there were pre-defined webinars, meetings, and student-instructor interactions. The OIG did eliminate many interactions as not being “substantive” (page 16):

    After identifying the employees who could reasonably be considered instructors, we determined what type of interactions could reasonably be considered substantive. We considered an interaction to be substantive if the course design materials described student interaction with a course mentor or required an individual submission of a performance task for which an evaluator provided the student feedback. We did not consider the following to be instances of substantive interactions between students and instructors:

    • Objective assessments that students submitted for evaluation because feedback on objective assessments was computer-generated, was not provided by instructors, and did not facilitate synchronous or asynchronous interaction between students and instructors.
    • Recorded webinars, videos, and reading materials if the course design materials did not require the students to watch the webinars or videos and then interact with an instructor. Many course outlines stated only that course mentors were available to students for assistance if the student wanted to contact the course mentor. Had the course design materials indicated that the recorded webinars, videos, and reading materials facilitated synchronous or asynchronous interactions, such as requiring the student to contact an instructor or participate in an online discussion moderated by an instructor, we would have considered those instances to be substantive interaction.
    • Contact with student mentors because the accrediting agency’s recognition, the school’s description of the student mentor’s role, and our interviews with six student mentors disclosed that student mentors did not provide instruction on the subject matter of the courses that students were taking.

    To be “regular”, the OIG required that all interactions be pre-planned, with the right people, in the course design materials (page 16).

    We did not find any evidence in the course design materials for 69 courses that would provide a reasonable basis for concluding that planned student interactions with course mentors and evaluators could be considered as occurring with some reasonable frequency (regular). The only evidence of regular interaction was student contact with student mentors. However, student mentors did not provide instruction.

    In its comment on the draft findings, WGU complained that OIG (page 20 and 26):

    did not count, as regular and substantive interaction, significant interactions not described in course outlines.

    OIG’s response basically agreed with this complaint:

    We considered all events described in course outlines and pacing guides, along with calendars of live events referenced in those materials. If substantive interactions were not described in any of these course design materials, we had no reasonable basis to conclude that such interactions were part of the design of the courses and did not consider them as planned course requirements. [snip]

    Course mentors might have identified students who were struggling, and many course outlines instructed students to contact course mentors if the students needed assistance. However, if course design materials did not describe the interaction, there was no reasonable assurance that students had any regular and substantive interaction with course mentors.

    These views essentially reject not just WGU’s approach to CBE but also the broader movement of faculty from “sage on the stage to guide on the side”. Instructors, from the OIG view, must provide instruction on course content and interactions must be pre-planned in the course design materials, at least for online courses.

    Self-Paced

    While I assume there were good reasons for WGU to want to avoid being classified as a non-term school, their 2005 declaration that they were not self-paced but rather term-based now appears to be a self-inflicted wound (page 34).

    Western Governors University Comments
    Western Governors University stated that its courses were not self-paced. Students were given a pacing guide and were expected to complete a certain number of competency units each term. In addition, a key role of the student mentor was to guide the pace of academic progress with individual students to ensure course completion by a certain date. Students had some flexibility in the pacing and moved through the content at different rates to allow for their individual competency development. However, that does not mean that the courses were self-paced.

    OIG Response
    Western Governors University’s statement that courses were not self-paced is contrary to its advertising materials, pacing guide descriptions, and statements from school officials we interviewed. According to the school’s web site, students could complete a degree program as soon as they successfully completed all of the necessary assessments. Students who completed assessments quicker could complete their degree quicker. The school’s web site also stated that students could complete assessments as soon as they were ready; if they were already competent in a subject area, they could prove it faster and complete their degree faster. If students completed their programs in less time, they paid only the tuition for the number of student terms in which they needed to enroll to complete the program. Course outlines stated the following about the pacing guides: “The pacing guide suggests a weekly structure to pace your completion of learning activities. It is provided as a suggestion and does not represent a mandatory schedule.” Western Governors University’s Program Development Operations Manager, Director of Assessment Design and Development, and Associate Provost for Academic Services confirmed to us during the audit that courses were self-paced.

    Ouch. It is far different for OIG to arbitrarily pick their own interpretations of regular and substantive interactions than it is for OIG to use WGU’s own descriptions and interviews. This seems to be a strong argument by OIG.

    WGU Response and Web Site

    WGU’s response was dated May 22 of this year, so they have had time to prepare for the audit findings. They have a web site that explains the situation, answers basic questions, and highlights their arguments against the findings.

    WGU strongly disagrees with the Inspector General’s audit report, which challenges our innovative, results-proven faculty model.

    With this key arguments:

    WGU has complied with the higher education laws and Department of Education guidance since our founding 20 years ago. Students, graduates, and employers of our graduates can rest assured that WGU’s accreditation and financial aid eligibility are intact.

    Our accreditor, the Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities, has approved our faculty model and reaffirmed our accreditation in February 2017. Accreditors are responsible for determining whether a university is eligible for federal financial aid.

    Fixes Needed

    I agree with both Russ Poulin and Amy Laitinen regarding the need to fix but not remove the “regular and substantive interaction” regulations. From Inside Higher Ed’s coverage:

    Russell Poulin, director of policy and analysis at the WICHE Cooperative for Educational Technologies, said the department has done a “horrible” job of informing colleges about its expectations of how to comply with the regular-and-substantive requirements, which he said have changed over time.

    In addition, he criticized the inspector general’s decision to base its compliance position on disagreement about the mode of teaching at WGU when there is no evidence of any harm to students.

    “I totally agree with the intention of proponents of the ‘regular-and-substantive interaction’ rule, which is to avoid fraud. But it is an outdated method of reaching that goal,” he said via email, comparing it to a hypothetical decision by regulators to remove all ATM card readers because of the risk of credit card skimmers. [snip]

    Amy Laitinen, director of higher education policy for the group and a former Obama administration Education Department official, said the law was a response to rampant fraud and abuse.

    “We need to carefully fix (not gut) the now-outdated law to ensure that students are getting the academic and other supports that they need,” she said via email. “If we don’t do it carefully, it will be a fast race to the bottom, which would be bad for students and bad for the competency-based education community.”

    The Worst Part

    To me the worst part of the audit is the language used by the OIG that tries to make any disagreement with a hyper-literal translation of ambiguous regulations seem to be invalid (page 3).

    None of these 69 courses could reasonably be considered as providing regular and substantive interaction between students and instructors.

    Who holds these “unreasonable” views? The Department of Education and the Northwest Commission are two groups, among others. It’s bad enough that the OIG took the out-of-context, hyper-literal approach to the audit, but to not acknowledge the ambiguity and lack of clear guidance about this requirement is disingenuous.

    This audit is a travesty in my opinion. Even though it is likely to be rejected by the ED itself, it will have an impact, and the internal review of the audit will likely take years. I’ll write more about potential impact of the audit tomorrow.

    Additional Reading